group " had got into definite touch with the right of the XIV.
Corps from the Bonhomme pass. The I. Army had been suc-
cessful in fixing important enemy forces on its own front, and in
bringing considerable relief to the rest of the French line, despite
the fact that many men had been withdrawn from it to reen-
force those armies to whom decisive roles had been assigned.
The II. Army also had passed no less difficult days. On the morning of Aug. 21, after the defeat of Morhanges, Gen. Joffre wired, " The II. Army will endeavour to reconstitute and hold fast on the Grand Couronne and on the Meurthe and the Moselle." Gen. de Castelnau decided therefore to maintain at all costs the Grand Couronne and the line held by the XV. and XVI. Corps and the 64th and 74th Reserve Divs., while holding the rest of the army ready for a counter offensive in the area of Lenoncourt. But the situation rapidly changed, and it fell to Gen. de Castelnau's lot to prepare, not a counter-attack but an attack.
Early on Aug. 24 it was reported that at least two hostile corps were moving southwards, exposing their right flank to the II. Army. Gen. de Castelnau, seizing his opportunity, ordered an advance in the direction of Serres by one division of the XX. Corps and the available troops of the reserve divi- sions holding the Grand Couronne. The XVI. and XV. Corps, the 64th and 74th Reserve Divs. and the rest of the XX. Corps, were to contain the enemy in front, the II. Cavalry Corps cov- ering their right. The VIII. Corps on the left' of the I. Army was requested to cooperate by advancing on the front Rozel- ieures-Vennezey, in a direction almost at right angles to the II. Army front. Thus ensued the battle of Aug. 25.
Gen. de Castelnau's objective was Arracourt-Einville, which appeared to be the enemy's line of communication from the north. The main attack was to be supported on the right by the XVI. and one division of the XV. Corps, in concert with the VIII. Corps. But it soon became clear that the last-named formation would not be able to debouch to the N. of Essey and St. Boingt, and it became necessary to make the action of the II. Army more prompt and more intense. The II. Cavalry Corps, the XVI. and one division of the XV. Corps, were pushed forward, driving the enemy back to the E. of Rozelieures; at nightfall the XVI. Corps was in possession of this village and the XV. of Lamath and Blainville, while the main body of the II. Cavalry Corps was moving on Deinvillers. On the French left, progress, rapid at first, had been checked by a strong coun- ter-attack on Flainval; by evening, however, the XX. Corps held the heights of Sommerville, Flainval and Hudiviller with its nth Div. and its 39th Div. remaining in the region of St. Nicolas. To the N., portions of the IX. Corps and the 68th Reserve Div. held the eastern edges of the forest of Champenois.
After the battle of Aug. 25 Gen. de Castelnau proposed to seize the passages over the Meurthe S. of Luneville, and then to advance on the Einville-Arracourt road by attacking between the Meurthe and the Sanon and by seizing the heights of Serres. The fatigue of the troops, who had been marching and fighting continuously since Aug. 14, was the first cause of difficulty; and since the left centre and right of the I. Army were violently attacked one after the other, the II. Army had to manoeuvre by its right, while refusing its left, and the offensive on Serres could not be carried out with the necessary vigour.
However, in the course of Aug. 21 the II. Army made some progress. The XVI. Corps reached Remenoville and the XV. occupied Mont sur Meurthe, but could get no farther. The XX. Corps got as far as the line Friscati (N.W. of Luneville)- Deuxville-Maixe, prolonged to the left by the 7oth Reserve Div. which held Drouville. To the N. the i8th Div. (IX. Corps) maintained its positions in the area Courbessaux- Remereville-Champenois.
On Aug. 27 the XVI. and XV. Corps, to which the 74th and 64th Reserve Divs. were attached, fought a series of successful actions at Xermamenil and Blainville. The rest of the army re- mained halted. OnAug. 28itsright undertook a general offensive, with the idea of reaching the Meurthe, but the XVI. Corps and the 74th Div. after capturing Gerbeviller were held up and
finally driven out of the town and back to the Mortagne. The
XV. Corps was checked at the St. Mansey wood, between the Mortagne and the Meurthe, and did not push its left towards Vitrimont forest, while the XX. Corps made little headway N. of the Meurthe.
On Aug. 29 the XVI. Corps retook Gerbeviller, but was then checked all day in frontal fighting, which also delayed the advance of the XV. Corps on the Meurthe. Aviation reports stated that the enemy was preparing a second line of defence, facing the French left, and was evacuating the first line, which seemed to indicate that he was growing weaker. Gen. de Castelnau therefore decided to attack on Aug. 30 between the Sanon and the Nancy-Chateau Salins railway, and to take and consolidate the Serres heights. However, in view of the violent hostile attacks against the I. Army, the plan had once more to be modified, and again the II. Army was driven to manoeuvre by its right in conjunction with the I. Army. On Aug. 30 the principal action took place around the clearing of Fraimbois, S. of Luneville, between the Meurthe and the Mortagne. The
XVI. Corps and 74th Reserve Div., despite their losses, failed to take Fraimbois, but to the N. the XX. Corps occupied the signal of Frascati. On Aug. 31 the enemy's attacks on Rehain- viller (S.W. of Luneville) were repulsed, and the French con- solidated their positions.
It was not till Sept. i that Gen. de Castelnau could resume the manoeuvre originally planned for Aug. 30; he ordered that on this date the army should attack between the Meurthe and the Sanon, and take and hold the heights N. of Luneville. The XX. Corps was only partially successful in reaching its objective, and on the rest of the front the positions- were unchanged.
The situation of the II. Army had by this time considerably changed. Gen. Joffre intended eventually to resume the offensive on the centre and left of the Allied armies, but did not believe that the opportunity would come as it actually did; he therefore deemed it necessary to withdraw troops to thefullest extent from his right-wing armies, which were not called on to play a decisive part in this manoeuvre. On Sept. i orders were issued for the westward move of a cavalry division and a Chas- seur brigade; on Sept. 2 the i8th Div. (IX. Corps) and the XV. Corps were also sent off. In view of this additional weakening the II. Army seemed condemned to the defensive.
Moreover, at this moment, the fighting before Nancy neces- sitated new and great efforts on the part of that army. On Sept. 4 the enemy's activity became more intense on the Meurthe and in the Serres area, and towards evening they opened a bombardment on all the front between Vitrimont forest and Courbessaux. Emperor William II. had arrived from Metz with the intention of making a triumphal entry into Nancy in a few days' time. The Germans possessed an immensely power- ful heavy artillery and did not hesitate to employ it to the fullest possible extent; on the night of Sept. 5-6, in eight hours, over 3,000 shells fell on the hill of Amance in an area of little over 1,000 sq. yards.
By Sept. 5 both Gen. Joffre and the commander of the II. Army had appreciated to the full the seriousness of the situation. For a time they hesitated as to whether they should withdraw the army's left to the strong positions of the forest of Haye and the heights of Sappais and Belchamps S.W. of Nancy, or hold the line in front of the city at all costs. This hesitation seems to have lasted right up till Sept. 7; fortunately the second plan was adopted and carried out.
During the battle of Nancy, the French right, the XVI. Corps, the 74th Reserve Div., the XV. Corps and the 64th Reserve Div., fighting in the area Rehainviller-Xermamenil- Gerbeviller, maintained their positions practically intact from Sept. 6 to n. In the centre and on the left, however, the fighting was extremely fierce, and the French line swayed to and fro, from the Sanon to the northern edge of Champenois forest.
On Sept. 5 the enemy seized Maixe and Remereville, but lost the latter place again in the evening, and failed to dislodge the French from the eastern edge of Champenois forest. On Sept. 6 the 39th Div. (XX. Corps) attacked and reoccupied
