in the forthcoming attack, and for his tardy concession of
reserves for the threatened sector. The reinforcements sent
before the battle may have been insufficient in view of the
dispositions made by Brusati, but these dispositions did not
fit in with Cadorna's general plan, and, in fact, transgressed his
definite instructions. The positions held by the I. Army were
at many important points well in advance of those laid down
by Cadorna as the definite line of defence upon which he relied
for relative freedom in his operations on the Julian front.
And much labour had been expended in fortifying these advanced
lines, while the " battle positions," marked out as such by
nature and by the orders of the supreme command, had been
inexplicably neglected. There had already been friction between
headquarters and the I. Army command in regard to the tendency,
of the latter to go outside the role allotted. The difficulty was
to some extent an outcome of the difference of opinion in
regard to Cadorna's strategy which prevailed in the Italian
army. It was natural that those who had to deal with the
Trentino and Cadore sectors should see opportunity for offensive
action and chafe because they were not given the means to act.
It was perhaps natural, too, that they should be inclined to do
what they could with limited means in the hope of inducing,
by the bait of actual success, a revision of the general plan. But
such experiments in despite of discipline can only be justified
by success. This attitude, and these actions, were inspired
partly by the wish to exploit the opportunities that seemed
to offer and partly by the difficulty of maintaining permanently
an inactive defensive; but they were probably influenced by
the belief, which was widely shared, that an offensive in the
Trentino would give better results than continuance of the
attempts upon the Julian front. In any case, Brusati's I. Army
was aligned as though for an offensive. Its main infantry posi-
tions and the bulk of its guns were alike badly placed for defence
against a resolute attack. By Cadorna's direct intervention
the lines were modified in the Val Lagarina and Val Sugana,
and on May 8 Brusati was relieved of his command, a measure
which Cadorna had wished to take at a much earlier stage.
He was succeeded by Gen. Pecori-Giraldi, commander of the
VII. Corps (III. Army).
A week later the Austrian offensive was launched. The Italian wings in Val Lagarina and Val Sugana held firm, though some of the positions which should have been prepared had not been touched; but in the centre, between the Val d'Assa and the Val Terragnolo, where the Austrian fire was heaviest and the positions occupied were not suitable for defence, and where the Italian line was thin, the front was driven in. Cadorna, who had himself assumed direct control of the operations, ordered a withdrawal to S. of the Posina and E. of the Astico and Assa, while he dispatched ample reinforcements to support the retiring troops and gave orders for the concentration of a large reserve force, to be known as the V. Army, E. and S. of Vicenza. Heavy fighting went on until June 17, but a fortnight before that date the Austrians were held. By June 2 Cadorna felt himself safe, though his opinion was not generally shared. The line was holding; his V. Army was practically ready in the plains, and still untouched; and in fact, although the Austrians were to gain a little more ground at heavy cost, his confidence was fully justified. The Sir aj expedition was already condemned to failure when Brussilov, answering the appeal for cooperation made by Cadorna on May 19, attacked the weakened Austrian lines in front of him on June 4, and won the great victory that came within an ace of being decisive, if Cramon may be believed. At the Allied Conference held in the preceding March Brussilov's offensive had been fixed for the first half of May. As the time drew near the delay of a month was proposed, but when Cadorna asked for Russian cooperation and pointed out that the Austrian front in the E. had been weakened in order to carry out the Strafexpedition, the answer came that Brussilov would attack on June 2. His offensive, according to Falkenhayn, was not expected by the enemy to take place until the beginning of July; and, though it was delayed by two days in order to bring more troops into line, the surprise was complete. The
attack in the Trentino, based on a miscalculation, nearly ended in the collapse of Austria's eastern front and it brought no gain corresponding to the risk run and the losses suffered.
The Austrians were loth to give up the attack that had begun so well. For a fortnight after the beginning of Brussilov's drive they struggled to break through from the mountains to the plain, but at the end of that time, having made but negligible progress, they found their left wing attacked. Cadorna had begun his counter-offensive, and after a week's pressure the Austrians withdrew, flattening the salient which their advance had made. They withdrew skilfully and steadily, before the Italian counter-attack was fully under way, to a line considerably in advance of their old positions, including as it did Cima Dodici, both sides of the Val d'Assa and the Tonezza plateau. This advance was the sole gain made, and the immediate price paid for it, apart from the disaster on the Russian front, was a casualty list that was estimated at over 100,000 men. Nor did the penalty end here. Cadorna refrained from knocking his head against the lines upon which his retreating enemy turned and stood. The positions which he had regained were adequate to his aims in the Trentino, which were purely defensive, and instead of persisting in his counter-offensive he rapidly swung his reserves back to the Julian front, smashed through the Gorizia bridgehead and took Gorizia, and drove the Austrians from the western regment of the Carso plateau.
Cadorna had judged rightly and Conrad wrongly, and the former's swiftness of decision and manoeuvre led to a big Italian success. But there was a moment when the situation compelled Cadorna to consider and prepare for the possible retreat of the II., III. and IV. Armies from the Julian and Cadore fronts. Ten days after the opening of the Austrian attack he had to reckon with a possible failure of the troops of the I. Army to prevent the enemy reaching the plains in force. Cadorna made his plans for such a retreat, from the Isonzo to the Piave, and his frank statement of the possibility, together with his request for the recall of a division from Albania and one from Libya (one division had already been recalled from Albania towards the end of April), caused natural alarm in Rome. Salandra suggested a meeting of the commander- in-chief, the four army commanders, the premier, the Minister of War and two other members of the Cabinet, a suggestion which Cadorna declined, insisting that the responsibility for military decisions lay with himself, and not, as Salandra's proposal claimed, with the premier and council of ministers. He requested that if he no longer enjoyed the confidence of the Government he should be replaced at once. Salandra replied that his proposal had been misunderstood; but when the measures taken preparatory to a possible retreat from the Isonzo line were communicated to the Cabinet he returned to the charge, maintaining that such provisions could not be regarded as being confined to the province of the military authorities, but must be subordinate to the decisions of the Government. In reply Cadorna pointed out that military exigencies might demand immediate decisions which could not wait upon the deliberations of a Government, and that responsibility must lie with the commander-in-chief. Fortu- nately the question was not put to the test. The Austrian offensive was now fairly held, and it was not necessary to con- sider further, at this time, the question of a general retreat. The incident, however, has an importance as exemplifying a difference of opinion regarding the relative functions of the Government and the supreme command, which was to grow more serious as time went on. It was difficult, if not impossible, to say where precisely the functions of each should begin and end, and at a later date the friction increased.
During July, while a gradual transference of troops from W. to E. was being carried out, and preparations for an offensive on the Julian front were being hastened, the counter-offensive on the Trentino front was continued and several positions were taken, while the Austrians were kept on the gui vive by move- ments in Tirol. The attacks against the new Austrian lines in the Asiago and Arsiero uplands were not very fruitful; and on
