July 9, with his eye on Gorizia, Cadorna gave orders to slow
down the offensive and return to the idea of defence. The
attack farther N., on the other hand, gave good results. It was
clearly unexpected by the Austrians, and the Italians made a
considerable advance in the region of the Fassa Alps, occupying
the Passo di Rolle and the mountains of Cavallazza and
Colbricon on July 22, and seizing the village of Paneveggio,
in the Val Travignolo, at the end of the month. The Austrians
made repeated attempts to recapture their lost positions,
hurrying reenforcements into the Val Travignolo, but their
efforts were useless, and as the summer went on the Italians
gained more ground in successive sharp actions, though operations
on the grand scale were never undertaken and were indeed
practically excluded by the nature of the terrain and the lack
of communications. But the continued threat kept the Austrians
nervous, and by the autumn some three divisions of picked
mountain troops were concentrated in the valley of the Avisio.
During the winter of 1915-6, in preparation for an attack on Gorizia and the Carso, the right wing of the II. Army had been transferred to the III., so that the whole front from N. of Monte Sabotino down to the sea was under the command of the Duke of Aosta. Both III. and II. Armies had been temporarily weakened by the withdrawal of troops to form the V. Army, but even at the most critical moment of the Asiago battle the Duke had eight divisions and a dismounted cavalry division at his disposal. During July he was reenforced by three divisions, and a considerable number of heavy guns, and at the end of the month four more divisions with their artillery were rapidly transported from the Vicentine plain to the III. Army front. A further division was given to the army from the general reserve, so that the Duke of Aosta had under his direct command 16 divisions and a dismounted cavalry division. He had 1,250 guns, of which 520 were heavy or medium, and these were supplemented by nearly 800 trench-mortars (bombarde), of which 138 were of 24o-mm. calibre. These bombarde had been constructed during the winter in order to make up for the de- ficiency in heavy artillery which the manufacturing resources of Italy were inadequate to meet. The bombarda was in fact much more than what is usually understood by the term trench- mortar. Its range was much longer, and the destructive power of its big projectile was very great. Its advantage over the big gun, given Italy's poverty in manufacturing resources, was obvious. Its disadvantages are equally obvious: its forward position and the big flame of its discharge made it a relatively easy mark for the enemy's guns. The question of ammunition supply was also complicated by the forward position. The bombarda was a pis oiler, but thanks to the devotion of the bombardieri it rendered great service.
On the Carso and about Gorizia Boroevich was badly prepared to meet the Italian attack, for Cadorna 's quick transference of troops to the III. Army front enabled the Duke of Aosta to throw an overwhelming force against the Austrian lines. Boroevich had only five divisions in line and one in immediate reserve between Sabolino and the sea when the Duke launched his attack, and the Austrians were taken by surprise. The Duke began with a feint. On Aug. 4, after a heavy bombardment, the Italian VII. Corps attacked the low hills E. of Monfalcone, which had already seen much stubborn fighting. They stormed the enemy lines, but were driven back ugain by a counter- attack. The thunder of the guns continued all along the III. Army front a far heavier fire than had ever come from the Italian side, and on the morning of Aug. 6 the intensity of the bombardment was redoubled. The infantry attack came in the afternoon, when the VI. Corps attacked the Gorizia bridge- head and the XI. the summits of Monte San Michele. The VI. Corps, commanded by Gen. Luigi Capello, had outgrown the dimensions of an army corps, for Capello, acting under the Duke of Aosta, was in command of no fewer than six divi- sions. His attack was brilliantly successful. Sabotino was taken on the run, in 40 minutes, while farther S. the greater part of the Podgora ridge was torn from the Austrians and some detach- ments reached the river at sunset. The Austrians defended
themselves with the most obstinate valour. They counter- attacked frequently, and on the afternoon of Aug. 8, when they were finally driven across the river, they had gained precious time for their hard-pressed commander. Italian troops crossed the river the same night and the town of Gorizia was occupied next day without resistance, while a general attack on the Carso was breaking down the stubborn defence which had survived the loss of the summits of San Michele early in the first day's fighting. On Aug. 10 the Austrians were driven back across the Vallone, the deep cut that separates the San Michele-Doberdo section of the Carso from the main plateau. Only at the extreme S. of their line, on the low ridges abov the Lisert marshes, did they succeed in preventing a break through their original lines of defence.
Both to the E. of Gorizia and on the far side of the Vallon the advancing Italians found themselves faced by new line hidden among the woody slopes beyond the town or the stony undulations of the Carso. Cadorna still hoped to go through, for it was not yet clear whether the Austrians were standing on a line which they had fully prepared, or whether they were fighting to cover a retreat to positions still farther east. Hoping to find a way round, and at the same time to prevent a concentra- tion of force against the advance of the VI. Corps, he ordered an attack by the II. Corps from the Plava bridgehead, at the same time restoring the VI. Corps to the II. Army, and instruct- ing the Duke of Aosta to continue his attacks on the Carso. The attack from Plava came to nothing given the difficulties the terrain, the artillery preparation and support, through shortages of guns and ammunition, was totally insufficient and the VI. Corps was held up by hidden machine-gun posts. The information regarding the new enemy lines was meagre, and they were well concealed among the trees. Only the III. Army con- tinued to make progress, and Cadorna broke off the action in the plain of Gorizia, deciding that careful preparation wa necessary for an attack upon the new positions. He reenforced the artillery of the III. Army with guns taken from the II., and the Duke of Aosta carried on his attack for a few days mor before it became evident that on the Carso also the enemy line were too strong to be taken in the later stages of an offensive, with ammunition ebbing and troops already weary. The enemy troops, of course, were still more worn-out. Their reserves wen all in line, and to back these were only broken units and march battalions. If Cadorna had been able to bring, immediately, a fresh weight of destructive fire to bear upon the new lines he would almost certainly have gone through. He was still handi- capped by lack of material.
The loss of the Gorizia bridgehead was a serious blow to the Austrians, but the advance on the Carso was a still greater threat to their line as a whole. It gave the Italian III. Array ample room beyond the Isonzo, and an admirable line of observation posts. The Duke of Aosta's divisions were no longe attacking a formidable glacis, with every inch of their ground under the observation of the enemy, and with no " eyes " themselves to view his country. And an advance upon the Carso, now rendered more feasible by the alteration ir relative position, threatened to turn the enemy lines E. oi Gorizia. To complete the scheme, it is clear, a simultaneou attack to the N. of the town was indicated. Such an attack wa always in Cadorna 's mind; it had been attempted more tt once. But he had not been able, nor was he now able, to collect the means necessary to the simultaneous attack. His artiller strength, both in guns and shells, was altogether insufficient He had to choose between the Middle Isonzo and the Carso, and he chose the latter, with Dornberg, the Iron Gates and the Hermada as his objectives.
This idea governed the operations on the Julian front durir the rest of the year 1916. Three times Cadorna attacked on the main Carso plateau, between the Vippacco and the Brestovic valley, using the right wing of the II. Army in the Gorizia plair to support the main operation, the attack by the Duke Aosta's left. The first attack, launched on Sept. 14 and pursue for three days, was affected by bad weather and gave disappoint-
