short of munitions, but he was stronger than he had been in 1916, when he had pressed the Austrians very hard. There was reason to think that he and Brussilov between them could be trusted to deal with the hard-tried armies of the Dual Mon- archy, even though these were reenforced by German armies in the east. There were, moreover, obvious technical reasons against the choice of the Julian front for a joint offensive. The front lay far from the French and British bases and from their munition factories, and communications from France to Italy were not too good. On the other hand, Cadorna was right in pointing out that on the Isonzo front the enemy was more vulnerable than anywhere else in the whole western theatre of war, and that the Habsburg Monarchy was " less disposed to persist in the struggle " than Germany. An advance on the Julian front would have the great advantage of carrying the war well into enemy territory and so bearing more directly upon the resisting power of the people.
There were excellent arguments for both plans, but it is not surprising that the "Westerners" prevailed. If it had been realized that Germany and Austria were one for the purposes of the war, if the Italian front had been regarded as the right wing of the front in the W., a different decision might have been reached. But at this stage the tendency was to distinguish between Austria and Germany and rather to consider the Italian operations as being linked up specially with the war in the East. Still, the idea which was brought forward in Rome did receive consideration during the following months, and in the spring of 1917 both Nivelle and Robertson visited the Italian front. These were the first visits of any important British or French military authorities since those of Joffre and Kitchener in the autumn of 1915, and the occasion was taken by Cadorna to press the question of closer cooperation, especially in the event of an Austro-German offensive against Italy. Both Nivelle and Robertson agreed to the principle of direct cooperation by the dispatch of troops and guns, but both were inclined to prefer cooperation by a simultaneous attack, and, while a scheme for the quick transport of troops from France to Italy was prepared, no definite engagements were taken. It was agreed, on the other hand, between Cadorna and Nivelle that the French and Italian spring offensives, which had been provisionally planned at Chantilly the previous autumn, should be timed to coincide as nearly as possible. The Chantilly agree- ment had in view an attack in Feb. but the date was deferred till April. In the meantime the Austrian forces on the Italian front were considerably increased, and the fact of the German retreat in France, which upset the French and British plans, seemed also to increase the possibility of an Austro-German offensive on the Trentino front, or even of the double attack on the Trentino and Julian fronts which had strong advocates in Austro-Hungarian military circles. The prospect of an attack from the Trentino seemed to be increased by the fact that Conrad, who had been replaced by Arz von Straussenburg as chief of the general staff, was now in command at Bozen. Cadorna held that he could not attack on the Julian front until he could feel reasonably safe in regard to the Trentino, for his offensive would imply the weakening of the Trentino front, especially in artillery. His request for guns had not been met, and to give his attack a chance he had to strip the Trentino front of its heavy artillery. His case seems unanswerable, but in March Nivelle demanded the assurance that Cadorna would attack in the middle of April and suggested diplomatic pressure upon the Italian Government. Cadorna maintained his position, that he would attack when the situation in the Trentino per- mitted him to move eastward the heavy guns he required for his offensive. In April he received n batteries of British 6-in. howitzers and 35 French heavy guns, but this assistance, useful though it was, fell far short of the requirements he had indicated. Three days after launching his ill-fated offensive, Nivelle called upon Cadorna to attack, but the latter had already given the order, fixing the date of May 7. Bad weather caused a short delay, but the Italian guns opened fire on May 12. But for the weather Cadorna would not have exceeded the margin of three
men
lain
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weeks by which the Chantilly agreement had enlarged the expression " contemporaneous." The threat from the Trentino obviously justified a delay, but even with this handicap Cadorna succeeded in attacking within, or nearly within, the limits al- lowed by the provisional agreement. In the circumstances it is difficult to understand Nivelle's attitude or the comments made at the time, still less the criticisms published after the war.
Cadorna attacked on the morning of May 12, feinting with the III. Army on the Carso, and making his real attack against the hills N. and E. of Gorizia. North of the town the greater part of the long ridge (Kuk Vodice) running southward from above Plava was gallantly stormed and held against the most determined counter-attacks, but on the hills E. of the town little progress was made. As soon as the occupation of the Kuk Vodice ridge seemed assured Cadorna moved the bulk of his heavy guns southward, and attacked with the III. Army on the Carso. Lack of guns and ammunition made it impossible to attack in both sectors at once. Useful progress was made here also, a number of enemy positions being captured on the Carso proper, and the VII. Corps on the right carrying one line after another till they were half-way up Monte Hermada, which dominated all the southern Carso and was the enemy's ma bastion in this sector. But ammunition was running low: th offensive had to be broken off at a moment when it seemed though further success lay very near.
There was only a short breathing space. On June 4 the Austrian troops on the Carso, now grouped under the command of Gen. Wenzel von Wurm, counter-attacked in the most determined manner. Against the Italian left and centre they had no success, but on the right they found a weak resistance on the part of the troops who had come into line as reliefs They freed the lower slopes of the Hermada and took a lar; number of prisoners. This was the limit of Wurm's succes though his attacks were conducted with great determination ; his artillery fire was both accurate and intense. If Cadorna 1 been able to increase his artillery, his adversary had kept pa The Austrian gunfire, both in defence and attack, was far heav ier than it had been in former actions.
During the four weeks' fighting Cadorna used 31 division and his casualty list was very heavy: 132,000 killed and wounde He also lost more than 23,000 prisoners, the bulk of them due the weak resistance in the Austrian counter-offensive in Hermada region, though a considerable number of captures we those of troops who had pushed on too far in the Italian attack Boroevich had held his ground, or nearly, with 17 divisions, an his losses, including 25,000 prisoners, were close upon 120,0 Once more he had been pushed to the last extremity, and one more the fighting power of his troops and an ample supply machine-guns had checked the Italian effort, handicapped as i was by lack of ammunition for the guns.
The rumour of battle had scarcely ceased on the Julian fron when the Italians attacked N. of Asiago, in an attempt to driv the Austrians off the line which they had occupied after the offensive in 1916. The Italian attacking force consisted of 12 divisions, with 1,500 guns and trench-mortars, and the front did not exceed 9 miles. In spite of the strength of the forces employed and the weight of fire brought to bear upon the enemy lines, the general attack was a failure. On the extreme right alone, in the region of Monte Ortigara, the Alpine troops of the 5211 Div. made good headway and captured 500 prisoners. The le wing also gained ground to begin with, but could not maint their success. Bad weather interfered with the artillery wor and the troops suffered very heavily. The feeling was genera that the Austrian positions were nearly impregnable, and some of the troops fell below the usual standard. After a pause Alpine troops renewed their magnificent effort, gained mor ground in spite of the extreme difficulty of the terrain, an captured another 1,000 prisoners with several guns. But the advance left them in an impossible position, completely don nated by the enemy's reserve lines, and largely isolated from rest of the Italian force. The Austrians brought up strong serves of guns and men, and after a heavy artillery fire, whic
