caused heavy losses among the troops who were lying on the
bare rocky slopes of Monte Ortigara, they counter-attacked in
force. The Alpini were driven off the summits of the Ortigara,
but after a long struggle kept the Passo dell' Agnello.
The Italian losses in this abortive action were very heavy indeed, 24,000 killed and wounded and 2,000 prisoners, and it was commonly felt that in view of the initial failure farther S. it was a mistake to persist in the attack upon the Ortigara positions. An isolated success at this point was useless, as it could lead nowhere. The officers in command of the Alpini, who knew what was possible in such difficult conditions of terrain, were opposed to the further attempt and their mis- givings were fully justified. The record of the Alpine battalions was proof that they had no objection to attempting the impos- sible if there were sound reason for the attempt. On this occasion they felt that their sacrifice was useless, and though they fought and died as staunchly as ever, the remnants who came back from the Ortigara had the bitterness of failure.
The general situation at the end of June gave cause for disappointment and some anxiety. The big battle on the Julian front had come very near triumphant success. It had brought the Austrians close upon disaster, and it had shown once more that with a little added weight, especially of heavy guns and shells, the stubborn resistance of Boroevich might jjave been overcome. But the balance was swinging against the Entente. The whole military situation threatened to be altered by the disorganization which had followed upon the Russian revolution. While it was not yet fully clear that the revolution meant the defection of Russia, it had already meant the possibility of a considerable transference of guns and men from E. to W., and it had heartened the weary soldiers of Austria-Hungary. The prisoners taken by the Italians boasted that the whole effective strength of the monarchy would shortly be concentrated against Italy; and the information that came from the East all tended to confirm the fear that the Russian front, which had filled such an important part in the war for nearly three years, would shortly become a vast rest-camp for the soldiers of the Central Empires.
Russia was going out of action, and the consequences for the Western Allies showed clear enough. Nor was it only in Russia that signs of war-weariness had made themselves evident. This was in fact the critical year. France for the first time, after the failure of Nivelle's offensive, had to deal with serious disaf- fection in the army which had borne the heaviest burden, and suffered most, of the Western Allies. In the case of England,
I though the army was sound, there were disquieting symptoms among the population. In Italy war-weariness was showing itself in various ways. The troops who failed on the slopes of the Hermada had displayed a mutinous tendency before going into line, and in the attack in the Asiago uplands some of the units had shown less than the usual spirit. Cadorna was disturbed by these manifestations, especially by the first, which he put down to " defeatist " propaganda in the country. He addressed urgent protests to the Government, claiming that the Ministry of the Interior did not show sufficient severity towards anti-war propaganda. The fact of war-weariness could not be
':, disputed, and there were ample reasons for its existence, both in the army and in the country. Units were kept too long in the trenches, partly because the wearing effects of these long spells were not fully realized, but partly also because the number of troops available was small in relation to the length of the front, which was nearly as long as the Allied front in France. Nor was it then generally understood that the soldier who comes into rest billets requires " remaking " as well as rest. In the first place, little or nothing was done in the way of providing comforts and recreation. It was only in the summer of 1917 that recreation huts began to be established and the idea of organizing amusements found favour with the authorities. Another lack was the almost complete absence of the volunteer canteens near the front which proved so useful in France. For his modest additional comforts the Italian soldier had to depend almost entirely upon the speculative ventures of small dealers who
made large profits. And the pay of the soldier gave him no margin for such expenditure. There was little to soften the hardships or lessen the dreariness of life in the war zone.
In the second place, the rest periods were not utilized as they might have been for the training of the troops in the methods of warfare that experience was constantly developing. The loss was double. Both officers and men suffered from lack of knowl- edge and practice, and, not less important, they suffered from ennui. They were either occupied in dull fatigue duties, or, in many cases, they were not sufficiently occupied at all. Too often they had little to do but to wonder when the war would come to an end. Socialist newspapers preached that the enemy was ready for peace, and among the new drafts were some who told the same story. Anti-war propaganda was active both in the country and in the army, and neither at the front nor among the public was there efficient counter-propaganda.
Another reason for depression was the actual shortage of food, both in the army and in the country. Conditions had grown very difficult in Italy. The soldier's ration had to be cut down to a very low standard, so that the lack of extra comforts was all the more severely felt. And at the same time the troops were distressed by the news that their families were suffering want, and even actual hunger. The allowance to soldiers' families was altogether insufficient in view of the great rise in the cost of living. In all these ways the strain upon the army was far greater than that experienced by the troops of England or France. To those conversant with the conditions it was a matter of surprise, not that there was discontent here and there, but that the willingness and cheer- fulness of the troops as a whole triumphed over circumstances that tried them so hardly.
There was reason for anxiety owing to war-weariness, but there were many signs of the same trouble in the enemy's camp. It was felt that Austria-Hungary was very near the end of her tether, and subsequent revelations showed how grave the situation was. The chief cause for anxiety lay not in the occasional symptoms of weariness, which had become evident elsewhere as well as in Italy, but in the hard fact of the Russian catastrophe. The effect of this disaster was both material and moral. It definitely altered the military balance, and, while it encouraged the Central Empires to go on, it clearly removed to a distance the prospect of an Entente victory with which the year had opened. The advocates of " peace without vic- tory " were heartened in their efforts to show that a continu- ance of the struggle was useless.
The military situation was changing for the worse, but there seemed a chance of striking the enemy hard before he could definitely ignore the eastern front. At the end of July there was a further inter-Allied discussion regarding plans, in Paris first and then in London. In Paris, Cadorna was urged to undertake two big offensives, one in Aug. and one in Oct., but it was not difficult for him to show that his supply of shells would not permit of two attacks on the grand scale. Nor were his trained reserves adequate, in view of the casualties with which he had to reckon. The discussions were continued in London, when Cadorna had returned to Italy from Paris, and the idea of a joint offensive on the Italian front was brought forward again by Gen. Albricci, who represented Italy. It was clear that such an attack could not be undertaken at once, in view of the great Flanders offensive which had just begun, and from which so much was hoped. Albricci's proposal was to delay the Italian offensive planned for Aug. until the Allies could spare troops and guns to give the added weight which experience had shown to be necessary. The idea was not at once rejected on this occasion. The suggestion was made that Allied reinforcements should be sent in Oct., when it was hoped to have reached objectives set for the Flanders attack. Albricci feared that this might mean losing the favourable season for an Italian offensive. The experience of the previous year had shown that the autumn mist and rain on the Isonzo front were a serious handicap to artillery fire, and the counter- vailing advantages to an attack were not yet realized by the
