were free from their transport, were detrained at Mantua and assembled near the Adige.
On Nov. 10, the day after Diaz took over the command from Cadorna, came the first enemy attack against the new lines, a tentative action on the Middle Piave, but after several unsuccessful attempts to pierce the line W. of the river, the Austro- German efforts were concentrated on the mountain front, between Asiago and the Piave. The main thrust was between the Brenta and the Piave, where a desperate struggle raged for weeks, though Conrad gained ground in the Asiago uplands, and might perhaps have gained more if he had been given the reenforcements for which he called in vain. The critical period was the fortnight from Nov. 10-25, and the end of the month saw the line fairly established. The Austro- German attack was to continue for another four weeks, and the Italians were to lose more ground in the mountains, more prisoners and some guns. But the crisis was past.
At the end of the third week in Nov. the Allied divisions began to move up to the front, and at the beginning of Dec. they took over the sectors assigned to them, three French divisions occupying the Monte Tomba-Monfenera ridge W. of the Piave and a similar British force holding the Montello sector, on the Middle Piave. It was expected that the enemy would attack at both these points, but throughout Dec. Boroe- vich's Isonzo army lay practically idle to the E. of the Piave, nor were the French attacked. The aim, naturally, was to attack as far W. as possible and so turn the Italian positions from the N., and compel a further retreat. Conrad in the Seven Communes and Krauss in the Grappa sector hammered in vain, favoured by the late coming of the snow, but hampered by bad weather and insufficient communications. Their efforts were fruitless. On both sides of the Brenta the Italians fought them to a standstill, and on Christmas day the long struggle ended, with the Italians counter-attacking, and 1 the enemy hard pressed to hold the slight advantages they had won.
The Italian recovery on the Piave-Grappa line, that great triumph over disaster and despair, was one of the most remark- able achievements of the war. On the result of the fighting in those November days depended the ability of Italy to continue playing a principal part in the world-struggle. Further defeat would not have meant submission, for the Austrian invasion had stilled the questioning voices and bound the nation in one resolve. But further defeat, with its consequent loss of war material and territory, would have so weakened Italian military strength as to render still more critical the position of the Allies. If Austria had been able to assist Germany the following spring, the course of the 1918 campaigns would certainly have been changed. Hence the service rendered to the Allies by the men who held fast on the Piave and in the mountains was incalculable.
During Nov. and Dec. the Italian armies suffered further heavy losses, some 20,000 killed and 50,000 wounded, and the total number of prisoners lost in the last three months of the year, including those belonging to labour battalions and the sick and wounded left behind in hospitals or on the field, was increased to 335,000. The total loss in men from Caporetto to the end of the year was close upon 450,000. When to these are added the disorganized troops of the II. Army, and the Carnia Force and the stragglers from the III. Army, the temporary loss may be calculated at 750,000. But the prompt arrival of the British and French troops and the quick reorgani- zation of a portion of the broken units shortened the critical period. The Allied divisions, as has been said, were in position by the beginning of Dec., and before that time two corps of the II. Army had been reconstituted and had gone into line. Another followed immediately afterwards, and by the end of the year two others were reformed and ready. For the remaining three dis- banded corps, which were reorganized as the V. Army, under the command of Gen. Capello, late commander of the II. Army, a longer period was necessary. In the case of these units the loss of cohesion had been more complete, and, moreover, the supply of guns, rifles, etc., was insufficient to arm them. When they moved into the zone of operations in Feb. they were
still partially equipped with French guns and rifles, but befo long these were replaced by Italian material. In addition to the reorganization of these units, a system of march brigades was instituted for the retraining of stragglers and other troops superfluous to establishments.
The winter saw a comprehensive reorganization of the whole Italian army. There was a technical reorganization, based on a recognition of new war conditions, and greater attention was given to specialized instruction, both for officers and men. More important still were the measures taken for the welfare of the troops and their families. The shock of disaster and invasion had brought about a great reaction both in the army and the country, but it was clearly necessary to alter the conditions which had made some of the troops inclined to lend an ear to the peace propaganda which had been rife during the summer. Diaz devoted special attention to this work, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the value to the Allied cause of the great task of reorganization carried out by him during the winter.
After the failure of Krauss and Conrad to break through to the Venetian plain, the Italian front saw no action of first-class importance for nearly six months, but there were several minor combats worthy of mention. The first of these was a brilliant attack by a French division on Monte Tomba, which finally drove the Austrians down the northern slope of the ridge to the Ornio torrent. The artillery preparation was particularly destructive, and the positions were stormed with great dash. Nearly 1,500 prisoners were taken, and the French losses wer insignificant. This attack was followed by two small Italian attacks, on the Lower Piave and on Monte Grappa respectively, which showed that the troops had regained their offensive spirit and, at the end of Jan., by a notable success in the Asiago uplands Two important positions were wrested from the Austrian and held against repeated counter-attacks. More than 2,50 prisoners were taken, with six guns and 100 machine-guns. The only other important feature during the winter months wa supplied by the Austro-German air raids against Padua* and Venice and the little towns of the Venetian plain, and the activity of the Allied airmen along more legitimate lines.
Gen. Otto von Below and the German divisions left tb Italian front at the beginning of 1918, in anticipation of th great offensive which was being prepared on the western front Austrian and German divisions were now coming W. in increas ing numbers from the Russian front, and it was clear that bot armies would attack at the earliest possible moment. Gei Plumer left Italy to take up his old command when it wa 'evident that the German blow would come first. He had acquired a great popularity among all with whom he came in contac and his departure was much regretted. Fortunately he left in the Earl of Cavan an admirable successor.
The spring saw a change at the Italian headquarters, the appointment of a commission to enquire into the Caporctt disaster Cadorna was recalled from Versailles and replaced by Giardino, who had shared with Badoglio the duties of sub-chie of staff. This appointment was only temporary, for shortly afterwards Giardino and Di Robilant changed places, Robilant going to Versailles and Giardino assuming comman of the IV. Army.
When the German offensive in March 1918 pierced the lit of the British V. Army four French and two British divisior were immediately withdrawn from Italy to reenforce the Allie armies in France. These were followed by the Italian II. Cor under the command of Gen. Albricci, which was to distinguis itself in the fighting W. of Reims. This left Diaz with 55 divisions (50 Italian and 5 Allied) as against 60 freshly organiz Austrian divisions. The Austrian command had taken the op portunity of the winter lull to reorganize the army, of whic 60 divisions were now concentrated on the Italian front, and according to Krauss, the reorganization gave rise to grea confusion and much unnecessary work and fatigue. It was probably due to this work of reorganization that the Austrian offensive which was expected in April was planned for the en ' of May or beginning of June.
