The original proposal of the Austrian command was to make
ia drive on both sides of the Brenta and concentrate upon this
single attack, but Conrad thought the sector unsuitable and
pressed for an attack upon the line in the Asiago uplands.
Krauss was consulted, and disapproved of both plans. He
argued that the aim of an offensive must be the destruction of
the Italian army, and that this could only be achieved by an
attack farther W., on both sides of the Lake of Garda. A
successful break-through by the Val Lagarina and the Giudicaria
would cut off the whole Italian army, while the other attacks
could do no more than force a retreat. He pointed out the
great difficulty of movement, both of guns and troops in mass,
in the Brenta and Asiago sectors, and claimed that his plan,
based upon good communications, was in every way preferable.
Krauss's plan found no support, and it was arranged that Conrad should have his way. But Boroevich urged that the main offensive should be accompanied by a straight drive by his armies across the Piave. He apparently thought that this should be the main operation, and opposed the attack in the Asiago uplands, but a compromise was effected, and both army groups attacked on June 15. Conrad attacked with Scheuchen- stuel's XI. Army, from S. of Asiago to Monte Grappa, the main drive being against the British and French divisions S. of Asiago, who had taken over this sector in March, while the Archduke Joseph attacked the Montello and Werzel von Wurm crossed the Lower Piave. Conrad had 27 divisions at his disposal, and Boroevich 23. Conrad's attack was a complete failure. It went well to begin with, but by the end of the day all hope of success had gone. Counter-attacks had retaken most of the positions lost in the first rush, and by the evening of June 16 Conrad was finally beaten. Boroevich on the other hand made good headway on the first two days. Though his principal attack, astride the Oderzo-Treviso railway, was immediately held up, he succeeded in establishing three bridge- heads across the Piave, and at two of these on the Montello and opposite San Dona del Piave, the attacking troops penetrated some distance westward. In various places the Italian front lines were quickly overrun, and many prisoners were taken. But a very thorough defensive system had been prepared, and while the front lines had been comparatively lightly held, there were ample reserves on the spot and within easy reach. After a week's fighting, at the end of which time the Austrians were being closely held within the limited room they had won, and had lost ground in various places to Italian counter-attacks, the order was given to retire across the Piave. Some days previously the attacking troops had been handicapped by the sudden rising of the Piave, but the river was falling again before the retreat was ordered and Boroevich, in a letter written after the battle, lays the blame, not on the Piave, but on Austrian headquarters, which had failed to organize the attack on proper lines and give the necessary supplies in time.
It is clear that the offensive suffered from the struggle between two opposite views, that of Boroevich and that of Conrad, and that strength was distributed instead of being concentrated. But Conrad probably had as many divisions as he could use in the sector he chose for his attack, and it is difficult to see that Boroevich could have won a big success even if he had been able to dispose of more troops. A concentration of force in the mountains and an extension of Conrad's attacking front farther W., to include the Val d'Astico and even the Val Lagarina, might perhaps have offered a better chance, but judging from the circumstances and issue of the fight it is hardly likely that any different plan would have led to a victory worth gaining. Even' where the attack was initially successful, it was fairly held when the reserves of the defence came into play. The fact is that the Austrians had greatly under-estimated the Italian powers of resistance. Von Cramon stated that the spirit of the Austrian troops was excellent, and that every technical preparation had been made that both Conrad and Boroevich reported in this sense to the Emperor.
The Austrian failure was costly, for the casualty list totalled over 135,000 and more than 24,000 prisoners were taken; but
the moral effect of the defeat was far more important than the material loss, grave though that was. Few single weeks through- out the whole war saw more bloodshed, for the Italian list of killed and wounded was over 40,000. No single week, perhaps, up to this point, led to so evident a victory or marked so clear a turning point. The defeat on the Piave and in the mountains broke forever the offensive power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the fact was plain to see. There was, moreover, a further significance in the Italian victory. It was the first Allied success of the year, and it came at the end of a period in which the resistance of the Allied arms had been tried to the uttermost. The message which Mr. Lloyd George sent to the Italian premier, Signor Orlando, gave full emphasis to the fact. " This great success has been a deep source of encourage- ment to the Allies. Coming as it has at the most fateful hour of the whole war, it is a good augury that the alliance of free nations will ere long free the world once for all from the military domination which has threatened it so long."
The defeat made a profound impression in Austria-Hungary, and led to much criticism of the army command. The discussion was specially bitter in the Hungarian Parliament, for the Hungarian troops had suffered very heavily, and it was alleged that the attack had been conducted with insufficient means. This charge was not borne out by the facts, and it was proved that the attacking armies were stronger in artillery and better supplied with shells than ever before, a comparison with the guns and shells available for the Caporetto offensive the previous year showing a very large increase. But the consciousness of impending disaster grew and spread through the monarchy and the troops were greatly disheartened by failure.
Prior to the Austrian attack the Italian command had had under consideration the question of an anticipatory offensive, on the Asiago plateau, with the object of gaining depth of posi- tion, and, if possible, of reaching the main Austrian line of com- munication between Trento and Feltre. When the extent of the forthcoming enemy offensive became apparent, this plan. was given up and the Italian armies stood on the defensive. The general situation, and particularly the supply of guns and men available, did not allow the concentration on the Asiago plateau of a force sufficient to carry out the attack contemplated. When the Austrian offensive was broken and the armies of Conrad and Boroevich thrown back in disorder, the question of a counter-offensive on the grand scale was considered by the Italian command. Lord Cavan urged that the original plan should be carried out, and was of opinion that Conrad's troops were so demoralized that an attack in the Asiago uplands early in July would lead to a very important success. Local counter-attacks by Italian troops, both on the Piave and in the mountains, gave good results, important positions being occupied and many prisoners taken W. of the Brenta, in the Grappa sector and on the Lower Piave, but as the enemy put up a stout resistance and the Italian losses were heavy, Diaz did not feel himself strong enough to attack in force without further careful preparation. His armies on the Piave had suffered severely, he had only six fresh divisions on the spot, and, above all, as his report states, " the supply services never very ample had been severely strained and were quite unequal to fresh operations over a wide area." A general counter-offensive, to include an attack across the Piave, was not practicable without prolonged and careful preparation. The same considerations did not apply in equal measure to an offensive operation on the Asiago plateau, where there was no treacherous river to cross, but Diaz was preoccupied by the question of reserves. Excluding the boys of the 1900 class, who were being held in reserve against the possibility of the war continuing into another year (at that time the possibility was generally regarded as a probability, if not a certainty), his supply of men was little more than sufficient to make good the normal wastage of the next six months. An immediate attack in the Asiago uplands might very well have led to important results looking back after the event with further information available, the chance of success can be seen
