In the early hours of the same day British troops occupied the long shoal island of the Grave di Popodopoli, crossing the main channel and driving back the Austrian outposts. The general offensive should have followed the next night, but a sudden rise in the river counselled delay, and it was not until the night of Oct. 26 that the bridges began to be thrown across the river for the main attack. Next day three bridgeheads were estab- lished: opposite Pederobba, N. of the Montello, and opposite the Grave di Popodopoli. The most important advance was made in the latter sector, where the X. Army succeeded in advancing to a depth of over two miles, and took over 5,000 prisoners. North of the Montello the left wing of the VIII. Army gained about a mile, though its bridges were all destroyed during the day, but the right wing of the army was unable to throw its bridges and only a detachment of storm-troops reached the left bank. There was a gap of some six miles between the left wing of the VIII. Army and the British Corps which formed the left wing of the X. Army, and the chief move in the general manoeuvre was checked. No better fortune attended the efforts made the following night. The swift current and the enemy guns defied all attempts to establish the bridges, and the engineers suffered very heavy casualties. In spite of the initial successes, the situation was unsatisfactory, but after the first failure to cross the river E. of the Montello Gen. Caviglia, who commanded the VIII. Army and had the general direction of the attack, had detached the XVIII. Corps to cross by the X. Army bridges, push N. and clear the front of the troops who were held up. The move was entirely suc- cessful. The XII., VIII. and X. Armies all made good progress, especially the X.; the separation of the Austrian V. and VI. Armies was effected, and on Oct. 29 troops of the VIII. Army reached the town of Vittorio Veneto. By that evening the attacking armies had taken 33,000 prisoners, and the position of the Austrian troops on the Piave front was hopeless. Next day resistance broke down, and the retirement which had already begun became a complete rout. The troops on Monte Grappa had hitherto held firm against the repeated attacks of the IV. Army, losing little ground, but here too, on the night of Oct. 30, a retreat began that was to turn into a flight.
Late on the evening of Oct. 30 the Austrian command an- nounced that in view of the discussions regarding an armistice which were being conducted between Germany and the United States " our troops fighting on Italian soil will evacuate the occupied region." On the same day the order for a general retreat was given, and that evening, in the Val Lagarina, Gen. Weber von Webernau, commander of the VI. Corps, made a formal demand for an armistice. Next day he and his staff were taken to the Villa Giusti near Padua, and discussions were begun. It was, of course, necessary to communicate with Versailles, where the Allied War Council was discussing the question of a reply to Germany's demand for an armistice.
Meanwhile the fighting continued, and the armies of the monarchy crumbled away. The Italian VI. and I. Armies attacked on the Trentino, and the III. Army, which had crossed the Piave two days before, was already taking part in the pursuit of Boroevich's broken divisions. On the night of Nov. 2-3, although the armistice was not yet signed, the Austrian command issued an order for the cessation of hostilities. It was at first revoked by the Emperor Charles, but was reissued and reached the front on the morning of Nov. 3. In point of fact the terms of the armistice were only agreed on verbally on the afternoon of Nov. 3, and signed at 6:30 P.M. Hostilities were to terminate at 3 P.M. on Nov. 4.
The Austrian surrender was complete. The troops of the monarchy were to retire beyond the Treaty of London line, leaving all war material and railway equipments. The army was to be demobilized except for 20 divisions at pre-war peace strength, and the Allies were to have the right to occupy any strategic points in Austria-Hungary which they might deem necessary, and were to have free right of passage and use of Austro-Hungarian means of transport " over all road- and rail- and water-ways in Austro-Hungarian territory."
When hostilities ceased Italian troops were far up the Trentino, in the Upper Adige valley and in the hills to the S.W. of Bozen, while in the main valley they had pushed beyond Trento and reached Salorno. Other troops had advanced far into Cadore, and to the E. the line of the old frontier was passed and the middle waters of the Isonzo were reached. On Nov. 3 Trieste had been occupied from the sea, and half an hour before the expiration of the armistice term an Italian force was landed at Zara in Dalmatia.
When the hour struck for the cessation of hostilities, more than 300,000 prisoners had already been counted by the Italians, and the total figure exceeded half a million. A number of troops who had been cut off were allowed to pass the frontier after being disarmed, but not much more than half of the Austro- Hungarian troops on the Italian front reached the territory of the crumbling empire. All material was left behind, in- cluding some 7,000 guns. The defeat was overwhelming.
The Austro-Hungarian armies, in spite of their bad food and growing depression, began by putting up a stout resistance. The troops in the Grappa sector in particular not only resisted firmly but counter-attacked with great vigour, and punished the Italian IV. Army very heavily. The seven divisions of the IV. Army lost over 20,000 men, nearly three-fifths of the total casualty list, which exceeded 35,000. The fighting on the river front was stiff at first, but the defenders were heavily out-gunned (their main artillery concentration was in the Grappa sector), and they were outmanoeuvred and outfought by the attacking infantry. They were already soundly beaten when the order to retreat was given, and when that order reached them they threw up the sponge. Some of the reserve units had shown a disinclination to move up to the front, and two brigades had previously been sent to the rear because they could not be trusted. The troops in reserve had been more affected than those in line by the news of the general breakdown in Austria-Hungary, and they had no stomach for what must have seemed to them a useless fight. In the end the leaders too threw up the sponge. They knew, although the troops did not know, the hopelessness of the situation.
It was exactly a year after the great disaster of Caporetto that Italy shattered the armies of Austria-Hungary. Seldom in history has so great a disaster been followed by so complete a triumph. Yet the final overwhelming success of Vittorio Veneto was not Italy's greatest victory. The way to it was paved by greater deeds, the wonderful recovery on the new line after the great retreat, and the successful resistance against the last Austrian offensive that was the first ray of light to break upon those gloomy months when the fortunes of the Allies seemed at their lowest. Nor can the sum of Italian achievements be judged by the issue of those battles which were crowned with victory. Italy's achievement, her contribu- tion to the great effort that led to the final triumph of the Allies, can only be gauged by a review of the campaign as a whole, by a realization of the extent to which she drained the resources of Austria-Hungary, and of the price which she paid. Her dead totalled 564,000 (a revision promised to increase this figure); her wounded exceeded 900,000; 570,000 men were permanently disabled for military service by wounds or disease. The propor- tion of dead to population (in 1915) was over 1-5%, nearly as great as the proportion suffered by the United Kingdom, and greater than the percentage of dead among the white population of the British Empire. For the first two and a half years of the war the Italian armies were fighting almost entirely in enemy territory, threatening the Austrians in a vital spot and keeping employed a number of enemy divisions that increased from 20 to 40 (in the summer of 1917). During the last three months of 1917 the number of enemy divisions rose to 55, and in 1918 practically the whole effective strength of Austria- Hungary was arrayed against Italy, the number of divisions at one time approaching 70.
The figures speak plainly, and Ludendorff, in an interview published in the spring of 1919, gave Italy her due in placing among the chief causes of the German defeat " the lack of sup-
