more clearly but at the moment the general circumstances of
the war seemed to impose caution. In July Germany was still on
the offensive, though the failure E. and W. of Reims in the
middle of the month and Mangin's great counter-blow a few
days later were finally to, put an end to all hopes of victory on
the western front. But Diaz had to count upon his own resources,
and he had to take into consideration the possibility that
Germany might succeed in establishing a defensive front in
France, and join Austria-Hungary in a last attempt against
Italy. He had to be prepared for defence as well as attack, and
his weakness in man-power and material enjoined caution. He
decided to wait until his units were remade, his stores of am-
munition replenished, and his supply services reenforced. Plans
were drawn up and preparations made for an offensive between
the Vallarsa and the Brenta in the middle of September.
The considerations which governed the Italian preparations were resumed by Diaz in a report published in the spring of 1919. " The plan for the offensive, considered by itself, had to aim at assisting the general effort of the Allies to the utmost in accordance with two different and possible solutions; to drive the attack home with all available forces, throwing even the last available man into the scale, in case the possibility presented itself on the fronts of the Entente of obtaining a real superiority of forces and of gaining a decision at one blow; or else to make a preparatory attack as a first phase of a more complex effort, in case the enemy, although already beaten, should succeed in reestablishing a solid defensive front in all the theatres of war." Diaz did not think that the time was ripe for the more ambitious effort, but he did not lose sight of the possibility which might be afforded by a change in the course of events. He prepared for the attack between the Vallarsa and the Brenta, but at the same time, according to his report, " another and bigger scheme was being silently matured in the interior of the Comando Supremo, entrusted to a few men only to be worked out and guarded with the strictest secrecy."
In the meantime a joint Franco-Italian offensive in Albania had caused the Austrians some trouble and compelled them to reenforce their line. They had lost several thousand prisoners, and the Italians had occupied both Berat and Fieri. This occupation was only temporary. When Gen. Pflanzer-Baltin arrived with reenforcements in Aug. the Italian line, which was too far ahead of the French on their right, was withdrawn to the high ground S. of Berat and the Semeni river. Although the Italians had a large force in Albania (nearly 100,000 men), the difficulties of communications and the ravages of malaria made prolonged operations nearly impracticable, but the advance upon Berat served a useful purpose in detaching enemy reserves from a sector where they were badly needed, for the Allied attack against Bulgaria was imminent.
Early in Sept. Diaz went to Paris to discuss the situation. He was still preoccupied in regard to his reserves, and in view of the very large number of American troops now in France he urged that a strong American force should be sent to Italy, not to take part in the offensive planned for the middle of the month, but to act as a reserve in case of need. He pointed out that he was still inferior in numbers to the enemy, and that in spite of great efforts on the part of the munition factories he had no marked superiority in guns. He had to attack an enemy who held very strong positions, and he was without what an Allied committee of experts had agreed were the two essentials to a successful offensive tanks and yptrite gas. He was not satisfied that the moral of the enemy troops had fallen so low as to have any marked effect upon their powers of resistance. Several minor actions undertaken with the express object of testing their moral had found no lack of combative spirit. The appeal for American reenforcements did not commend itself to the Allies, who thought that the situation demanded the concentration of every available man and gun against the German armies, now very hard-pressed. Diaz was urged to attack with his own forces, and it was pointed out that the desperate internal conditions in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy must have affected the spirit of the army.
Diaz was not convinced by the arguments addressed to him in Paris, and the denial of American reenforcements, to be on the spot in case of need, was strongly felt at Italian headquarters. Diaz was determined to choose his own time for his attack, and Badoglio was at one with him. Waiting meant an increased supply of guns and shells, apart from other advantages. The situation was summed up in the report already quoted: " The Comando Supremo would never have been induced to incur a useless sacrifice of men, but it was ready to take any risks as soon as ever the situation rendered this useful and necessary."
The Italian command was severely criticised for its cautious attitude, in Italy as well as in the Allied countries, and as time went on, leaving the date originally fixed for the Asiago offensive so far behind as to preclude the explanation of a delay due to weather or to the necessity of putting the finishing touches to preparations, criticism in some quarters descended to the level of recrimination. Italy's difficulties and Italy's losses had never at any time been properly realized in England and France, and it was only natural that now, while British and French troops were slowly driving the Germans back and no news came from the Italian front, there should be a revival of the suggestion, so strangely current at various periods of the war, that Italy " was not pulling her weight."
This was ignorant criticism, but the Allied commands also felt strongly that Diaz was now in a position to attack, and the order had already been given to withdraw a portion of the British force in Italy when Diaz disclosed his plan for an early offensive on the grand scale. The general situation had been definitely changed shortly after the Paris visit. In the middle of Sept. the victorious advance from Salonika began, and seemed to offer the chance for the more ambitious scheme which had already been under consideration. The final details of this scheme were quickly worked out, and " on Sept. 25, four days before the conclusion of the Bulgarian armistice, orders were issued for a rapid concentration of troops, artillery, and technic services in the sector chosen for the attack, which was no long the plateau, but the Middle Piave " (Gen. Diaz's report).
The Italian plan was to concentrate on the river front betwe Pederobba and Ponte di Piave (E. of Treviso)," to cross ti river and break through by way of Conegliano to Vittorio Veneto, dividing the Austrian V. and VI. Armies. The gener situation rapidly improved, and it was clear that the German request for an armistice on Oct. 4, to which Austria-Hungary subscribed, would further weaken the resisting power of the troops of the monarchy. The attack was fixed for Oct. 16, but bad weather and a rise of the Piave caused a delay whic was used to extend the plan of operations. It was decided open the action with an attack by the IV. Army in the Grapp sector, with the double object of drawing the enemy reserve from the Feltre sector and of breaking through in this direction The attack on the Piave was to be carried out by three armie the XII., VIII. and X., of which the first and last had be formed specially for this offensive. The XII. Army, whic included a French division, was commanded by Gen. Grazian the commander of the French troops in Italy; and the X. Army which included the British XIV. Corps, was commanded Lord Cavan. The main drive was to be made by the VII Army, attacking from below Pederobba to Ponte della Frit The. XII. Army was to advance northward astride the Piav while the X. Army was to attack the right wing of the Austria V. Army and form " a defensive flank to cover and protec the principal manoeuvre of the VIII. Army " (Gen. Diaz's report). The attacking mass consisted of 22 divisions, of which two were British and one French, while 19 divisions were held in reserve. Against this force the Austrians had 23 divisions in line or immediate reserve, with 10 more divisions within reach. Nearly half the Austro-Hungarian force (30 divisions) lay between the Stelvio and the Brenta, or along the Lower Piave, while in these sectors the Italian forces had been reduced to a total of 16 divisions.
The IV. Army attacked at dawn on Oct. 24, and though some headway was made the enemy put up a very stubborn resistance.
