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roaring skywards in which the crews of both turrets perished. The " Derfflinger " succeeded in getting two hits into the " Colossus," the only hits scored by the Germans on the battle fleet. Scheer, some 3 m. behind his battle cruisers, saw it was time to turn. The line swung round together to the W. again at 7:17 P.M., and the 6th and gih Flotillas threw up a smoke cloud and rushed out to attack.

As they approached, the British battle fleet turned away two points to port by signal at 7:22 P.M. and another two points at 7 126, making the " Iron Duke's " course south-east. This was the " turn-away " which has given rise to considerable controversy. Eleven torpedoes reached the lines of the ist B.S. at 7:35 P.M. and were avoided by the use of helm. The British fleet was now going no more than 15 knots. The 5th B.S. (except the " War- spite," which had fallen out) was plodding along in rear at the same speed, wasting all the foresight, money and ingenuity expended in giving it a speed of 25 knots to pursue and encircle an enemy. But now the real counter to torpedo attack was found. The 4thL.C.S. and nth Flotilla were ordered to attack and were making W. towards the exposed wing of the battle fleet. The German 5th and 3rd Flotillas, which were advancing to attack, fled before them, and only one of their torpedoes reached the " Marlborough's " line. At 7:35 P.M. Adml. jellicoe turned back from S.E. to S. by W. and re-formed single line on a S.W. course by 8 o'clock.

The actual transfer to the E. of the original course in the case of the "Marlborough," caused by the turn-away, was little more than 1,250 yards. This in itself was no great distance, but the retention of the battle fleet on a south-easterly course, while the enemy was making W., opened a gap of several miles between the two fleets and made it difficult to renew the engagement before nightfall. The only movement of any real use at 6:55 P.M. and 7:22 P.M. was to follow the enemy and cut him off, as the battle cruisers attempted to do. From 6:55 P.M. the British fleet was meandering along to the S., when tactics of encirclement and pursuit were required to deal a decisive blow. Unfortunately Adml. Jellicoe considered the risk of submarine and torpedo too great for such tactics, though there were no submarines anywhere near the scene of action; and, after 7:36 P.M., as soon as the 4th L.C.S. and nth Flotillas gripped the situation, they never allowed the German flotillas to approach.

Beatty's battle cruisers had meanwhile been making to the S.W. and were 5 or 6 m. ahead of the battle fleet. At 7:47 P.M. the enemy was still in sight from the " Lion," and Beatty, evidently fearing that night might fall without a decisive blow, sent a signal to the C.-in-C. asking that the van of the battle fleet might follow him in an attempt to cut them off. At 8 P.M. the battle fleet turned W. in divisions with guides bearing north-

east. Scheer was some 18 m. W.N.W. of it on a S. course, so that the fleets were again converging. At 8:10 P.M. the C.-in-C., in reply to Beatty's signal, ordered the and Battle Squadron (Vice-Adml. Sir Thomas Jerram in the " King George V.") to follow the battle cruisers. But, apparently because Beatty was not actually in sight, though the "Minotaur" (2nd C.S.) was in sight of both the " Lion " and " King George V." and could have given him the " Lion's " position as she gave the " Lion " that of the " King George V.," he remained with the battle fleet and made no attempt to follow Beatty.

At 8 : 1 5 P.M. the fleets again came into contact. The " Castor " and nth Flotilla ahead of the British battle fleet sighted the German destroyers on Scheer's port bow, and, supported by the 4th L.C.S., drove them helter-skelter away. The " Calliope," " Comus " and " Constance " chased them right back to their battle fleet; and the " Calliope," making a torpedo attack on the " Westfalen," came under a heavy fire, and was hit five times, though not disabled. About 8:15, too, the "Falmouth" (3rd L.C.S.) and Beatty's battle cruisers, about 6 m. to S.W. of the battle fleet, sighted Hipper's squadron and the 2nd Squadron of Deutschlands on a S. course. A short sharp action developed at about 10,000 yd. Hipper's ships were hit again, as well as the " Schlesien," " Schleswig-Holstein " and " Pommern." At 8:30 P.M. they turned away to the S.W., passing behind the 3rd and ist Squadrons. The British battle fleet heard the guns, and at 8:30 P.M. turned into single line again on a S.W. course.

At 9 P.M. there could be no doubt that the enemy was some 6 or 7 m. to the N.W., but dusk was falling (sunset 8:7 P.M.), and the C.-in-C., having decided not to run the risk of a night action, turned S. in divisions] Half an hour later (9:27) the destroyers were ordered to take station astern 5 m. and took station in the following order from W. to E.: the nth (next the enemy), 4th, I3th, gth and I2th Flotillas. Unfortunately they were given no information as to the position of the enemy or of their own squadrons and flotillas or of the C.-in-C. 's intended movements, with the result that, instead of making organized attacks on the enemy fleet, the 4th Flotilla blundered into it during the night and was broken up or driven away.

Scheer at 9 P.M. had ordered his fleet to proceed in on a course S.S.E. J E. at 16 knots. The 2nd Scouting Group was on the port bow, the 4th Scouting Group just ahead. Then came the battle fleet in line ahead, the ist Squadron in front (ships in re-