versed order) with the " Westfalen " leading, and the 3rd and
2nd Squadrons behind. The " Derfflinger " and " Von der Tann "
formed the rear guard. The " Liitzow " and " Seydlitz " had
fallen out. The movements of the night can only be briefly de-
scribed. The British fleet continued to steer south. The German
fleet passed diagonally across its rear on a S.S.E. course, crash-
ing through the British destroyer flotillas on its way.
About 10:30 P.M. the 4th Scouting Group struck the 2nd L.C.S., then some 7 m. astern of the battle fleet. A short but fierce action ensued. The " Southampton " and " Dublin " were severely damaged, but the former, though she suffered severely, torpedoed the " Frauenlob," which had to be abandoned later. At 10:41 P.M. Adml. Jellicoe received Scheer's course from the Admiralty, which showed clearly that the latter was retiring towards Horn's Reef. To ensure meeting him next morning it was necessary to turn to a parallel course; Adml. Jellicoe did not do so, nor did he inform Beatty or anyone else of the enemy's course, and the fleet continued to steer south. At 11:30 P.M. there commenced a series of actions behind the battle fleet, which, passing from W. to E. across its stern, pointed a great finger almost directly at Horn's Reef, leaving a trail of burning vessels to mark the course of the German fleet as surely as the compass in Scheer's flagship. They can only be briefly described. At 11:30 P.M. the 4th Flotilla was struck and the " Tipperary " left blazing. The gallant little " Spitfire," trying to help her, rammed the " Nassau," smashed the battleship's searchlights, had her own bridge and funnel blown away by an n-in. shell, but got safely away with some 30 ft. of German plating on her bows. The " Rostock " was torpedoed in this encounter; the " Elbing " was rammed by the " Posen " and had to be abandoned, and sank. The 4th Flotilla turned away to the E., but, turning S. and ignorant of the German fleet's course, ran into it again at midnight, when the "Fortune " and " Ardent " were sunk. The " Black Prince," which had evidently been following the British fleet, was unlucky enough to run into the German fleet at this time, and, coming under a tornado of fire from the " Ostfriesland " and " Thiiringen " at 1,600 yd., vanished in a terrific explosion. The" Marlborough's " division and the 5th B.S. had fallen behind the fleet and crossed only some 3 or 4 m. ahead of the enemy battle fleet, whose ships were seen (the " Westfalen " being even recognized), a situation which might have developed in a variety of ways.
At 0:25 A.M. the gth Flotilla was struck and the " Turbulent " sunk. The i3th Flotilla had made off to the eastward. At about 1:45 A.M. the 1 2th Flotilla sighted the enemy, but Capt. Anselm Stirling drew oft" and made an organized attack at about 2:10 A.M., sinking the old battleship " Pommern." The i3th Flotilla sighted the enemy again at 3:30 A.M. and turned away, but the " Moresby " attacked and torpedoed the V4.
It was now getting light. Not a moment was to be lost if the German fleet was to be cut off, but at 2:40 A.M. the C.-in-C., instead of steering E. by N. for Vyl Shoal or Horn's Reef, altered course to north. At 3:29 A.M. another important signal arrived from the Admiralty, giving the German position not far from Horn's Reef at 2:30 A.M. It was still possible to try to inter- cept their disabled ships. There were no German mine-fields, nor any information of any, N. of Heligoland, and the only mine-fields near Amrum werea couple of British ones laid in 1915, which were certainly extensive but whose position was known. The C.-in-C., however, did not proceed farther, but at 3:42 A.M. turned W. and reduced to 15 knots. It is impossible to see in the fleet's movements any intention of renewing the action. The reason given is that the fleet was too scattered, but it would not have been scattered if it had been told to be 15 m. from Horn's Reef at 2 130 A.M. The destroyers would not have been scattered if they had not been left right in the path of an advancing enemy with no information as to his movements. Beatty would not have been 15 m. away to the S.W. t>f the battle fleet if he had known the German fleet was making for Horn's Reef. But he was not told. No one was told.
The action ends here. The German fleet proceeded in. The
Ostfriesland " struck a mine laid by the " Abdiel " on May 5.
The " Seydlitz " did not pass the Reef till 4 A.M. Three British submarines were off Vyl Light, but they had been told nothing and saw nothing.
The battle was not a decisive one, and the British battle fleet was never seriously under fire (its casualties were two men killed and five wounded). It must be admitted that the British C.-in-C. 's tactics were characterized by excessive caution. They were limited to the conception of a battle in single line at long ranges on a parallel course, and when Scheer turned away the British system of tactics did not permit of pursuit and fell to pieces. The C.-in-C. 's conception of tactics is to be found in a letter to the Admiralty of Oct. 30 1914 (Jutland Despatches, 601), which merits careful study, for (while it shows that he acted on a prearranged plan) it really constitutes a negation of the battle- ship and of battle-fleet tactics. Movements in battle were to be governed on this theory, not by the necessity of getting within effective range, but by the necessity of avoiding supposititious submarines. The principles formulated in that letter had, how- ever, been endorsed by the Admiralty, and they were followed at Jutland, though a defence of these principles or of the tac- tics of the British fleet at Jutland must lead with stern and irre- futable logic to the proposition that the battleship is an instru- ment of the past. The British tactics were dominated by a fear of the submarine or torpedo. There were no submarines pres- ent in the vicinity, and after 7:36 P.M. one light cruiser squad- ron and a single flotilla of destroyers proved sufficient to drive off the enemy's destroyers. It has been argued that this cau- tion was justified because Britain's naval strength was practi- cally all concentrated in the Grand Fleet. The answer, from a naval point of view, is that it was concentrated in the Grand Fleet for the very purpose of dealing a decisive blow; and com- merce defence, convoy and anti-submarine work had all been sacrificed to enable it to do so. The immediate result of the failure of Jellicoe to strike a decisive blow was that the German High Fleet remained intact, to be a bulwark to its submarines, and, by barring the Baltic, to hasten the disintegration of Russia.
Measured in terms of size and serried steel, and of opportunity, the battle of Jutland must bulk large in naval history, but the actual results at the moment were small. If a battle is merely an incident or a move in a blockade it may possibly be regarded as won when the enemy retires to harbour. No further fleet action occurred during the war, and eventually the German fleet sur- rendered. From one point of view, therefore, it may be said that the result was successful. But if a battle represents in war the economy of the decisive blow; if the enemy's fleet can still play an important part in the campaign; if, as Foch said, there can be no victory without a battle; and if Nelson's teachings are sound then the battle of Jutland, taken by itself, must rank merely as a great and unique opportunity for the British fleet, of which advan- tage was not sufficiently taken.
Losses. The British losses were 3 battle cruisers, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers namely, battle cruisers : "Indefatigable" (gunfire, 4:6 P.M.), "Queen Mary" (gunfire, 4:26 P.M.), "Invincible" (gunfire, 6:34 P.M.); cruisers: "Defence" (gunfire, 6:19 P.M.), " Warrior " (gunfire and abandoned, 7:45 A.M.), " Black Prince " (gunfire, 0:25 A.M.); destroyers: " Nestor" and " Nomad " (5:15 P.M.), "Shark" (6:5 P.M.), "Tipperary" (11:30 P.M.), "Ardent" and " Fortune " (midnight), " Turbulent " (0:30 A.M.), " Sparrow- hawk " (collision and abandoned, 9:10 A.M.).
The German losses were one battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers and five destroyers namely, battleship: " Pommern" (torpedoed, I2th Flotilla, 2:10 A.M.); battle cruiser "Liitzow" (gun- fire, abandoned and sunk, 1 145 A.M.) ; light cruisers: " Wiesbaden " (gunfire, 7 P.M.), "Frauenlob" (torpedoed, "Southampton," 10:20 P.M.), "Elbing" (collision, 11:30 P.M.), "Rostock" (torpedoed, 4th Flotilla, 1 1 =30 P.M.) ; destroyers V27 (i3th Flotilla, 4:40 P.M.), Vag (torpedoed by " Petard," 4:40 P.M.), V48 (about 6:30 P.M.), 835 (gunfire, at 7:25 P.M.), \'4 (torpedoed by " Moresby," 2 45 A.M).
Casualties. On the two sides these may be tabulated as follows:
British German
Officers
Men
Killed
Wound- ed
Prison- ers
Killed
Wound- ed
Prison- ers
Total
328 1 60
28
40
10
5,769
2,385
485 454
167
6,787 3.039
(A. C. D.)
