considerable. The Portuguese divisions were as good as annihi- lated. The II. Bavarian Corps turned in to the left and took Bois Grenier and Fleurbois. The XIX. and LV. Corps pushed through to the Lys. General Hoefer crossed the Lys at the lock E. of Sailly on April 9, thus enabling the troops attacking in a westerly direction to reach the opposite bank in the night of the loth. The crisis which threatened to develop in the afternoon, owing to the wearied German troops coming on fresh British reserves, was thus overcome. Further S. the LV. Corps, commanded by von Bernhardi, reached the La we at certain points. On the left wing the IV. Army Corps took Richebourg 1'Avoue, but failed to break the British resistance in the strongly fortified villages of Festubert and Givenchy.
This result did not come up to the Supreme Army Com- mand's expectations. All depended now upon whether the next few days would bring a more rapid advance. With the VI. Army this was not the case. The British machine-gun nests gave the German infantry much trouble, as the guns necessary for destroy- ing them could only be brought up with difficulty. An independ- ent success was gained by the II. Bavarian Corps, which reached La Chapelle d'Armentieres after more or less violent fighting. These troops, having advanced across the Lys at Sailly, had at first to repel some heavy British counter-attacks. They then pushed forward after being reinforced to Steenwerk, and so made the Lys crossing at Erquingham available. Further W. there was some heavy fighting round Pont Mortier. Here, too, some very lively British attacks were repelled. The XIX. Corps took the town of Estaires by house-to-house fighting and opened up the Lys crossing from La Gorgue. The LV. Corps managed to cross the Lawe between Lestrem and Vieille Chapelle. Of the IV. Corps only the right wing was able to advance with heavy fighting. On the left it could do no more than defend itself against heavy counter-attacks coming from Festubert. It was plain that the British were concerned above all to prevent any further rolling up of their front to the south.
Meanwhile the IV. Army had begun its attack. In the night of April o-io its artillery prepared the attack by several hours' gunfire, but without quite silencing the opponent's guns. Under cover of darkness the left wing of the X. Reserve Corps crossed the Lys, which flowed immediately in front of the oppos- ing lines. At 5:15 A.M. came the infantry attack delivered from Warneton and from either side of it. From the first it encoun- tered violent resistance. But the XVIII. Reserve Corps succeeded in enveloping and taking Meesen, and in holding it against heavy counter-attacks. The Hollebeke Park was also taken, and the attack carried to within 800 metres of Wytschaete. The X. Reserve Corps pushed through to the eastern boundary of the Ploegsteert Wood. Its left wing reached Ploegsteert village and Le Bizet, and repelled some violent counter-attacks. Behind the front the Lys was bridged at Deulemont and Frelinghien. , For this army, too, the difficulties were considerable. The completely ruined country of the Wytschaete battle-field (1917) made it extremely difficult to move or to judge what position had been reached. The superiority of the German artillery was not sufficiently great. The time for preparation had had to be cut very short; and the forces available were disproportionately weak. The success gained was all the more noteworthy.
The British were again chiefly concerned with reenforcing their wings which had held firm, and tried thereby to prevent the operative development of the break-through and the rolling-up of the adjoining fronts. A continuation of the German attack still, however, offered fair prospects. The army group therefore brought up further reinforcements on to the roads. The attack itself was resumed on April n, with lively fighting. The XVIII. Reserve Corps pushed its way into Wytschaete, and established itself later E. of that place and in advance of the Wytschaete Meesen road. The X. Reserve Corps took the Nightingale height (between the Douve brook and the Ploegsteert Wood) by envelopment from the Ploegsteert Wood, and its left wing a new position at Romarin. Further S., the town of Armen- tieres, with more than 3,000 men, 45 guns and ample stores, fell into the hands of the Germans. The II. Bavarian Corps pushed
through Nieppe to the Steenwerk railway station. The XIX. Corps succeeded by vigorous fighting in reaching Neuf Berquin church. The LV. Corps took Merville and Lestrem.
On April 12 no particular progress was made by the Germans. On the other hand, the counter-assaults to which the British had now resorted were all repelled in each case. The VI. Army took the northern portion of Calonne and the village of Lacon. An order from the army group on April 1 2 arranged for the continua- tion of the attacks by the inner wings of the two armies. Besides this the VI. Army was to prepare for the continuance of the attack on the left wing according to plan. It was still im- portant for the Germans to force a way into the hilly country N. of Bailleul, in order to relieve the position of the troops still remaining on the plain, and to excercise a strategical influ- ence on the Yser front. But the British resistance had been greatly strengthened in the meantime, and the German attack could only proceed spasmodically and in limited sectors.
The next effort, on April 13, was directed against the Nieuwe- kerke-Bailleul range of hills. The 36th Reserve Div. succeeded, though with heavy losses, in taking the high-standing Nieuwe- kerke from across the exposed plain. The heights W. of that place were also captured. The VI. Army made only slight progress. The XIX. Army Corps took Merris. Some portions of the LV. Corps, which had penetrated into the Nieppe Wood, had, how- ever, soon to give ground again.
On April 15 the corps of the IV. Army, to which the Guard Re- serve Corps had been added on the left wing, pushed on towards the hill of Kemmel. The XVIII. Reserve Corps got beyond the Wulverghem- Wytschaete road. The X. and the Guard Reserve Corps climbed the heights W. of Wulverghem and E. of Bailleul in the afternoon.
In spite of these advances at independent points the attack had, substantially, come to a standstill. The army group hoped to set it going again by a " Tannenberg " assault from the Houthoulst forest. This was to be directed against the line Merckem-Langemark, and was intended to force the British and Belgians to evacuate the northern part of the Ypres salient. But before the preparations were definitely arranged the Entente armies in the night of April 15-16 evacuated their positions from Poelkapelle to Hollebeke and retired to a position nearer Ypres. By this they gave up the whole gain of the battle in Flanders in 1917. The IV. Army immediately decided to follow up their advantage. After a short burst of fire the first-line troops ad- vanced and, by evening, had reached the line Mangelaere-Lange- mark-Veldhoek. The XVIII. Reserve Corps took Wytschaete and the heights N.W. of Wulverghem; the Guard Reserve Corps in conjunction with the VI. Army's right wing took Bailleul; and the III. Bavarian Corps which had replaced the II. Bavarian Corps took Meteren.
Here the battle of Armentieres ended. The IV. Army encoun- tered strong British-Belgian resistance at the Steen brook and gave up the projected attack there as hopeless. On the following day a German division was even forced backwards a little by a Belgian attack coming from Merckem. The attack, prepared some days before, by the left wing of the VI. Army (the IV. Army Corps and IX. Reserve Corps) against Bernenchon-Hinges and Festubert-Givenchy had no success.
Everywhere the strengthening of the resistance on the British front was evident, French divisions and batteries having been brought up here in daily increasing numbers. Only an organized attack, necessitating a great employment of force, would have been capable of overthrowing them. The German Higher Com- mand had no intention of attempting this, for in default of any surprise the conduct of the attack, if resumed, would necessarily have approximated to battles of material, favourable in their nature to the other side, and only capable in any case of minor results. The army group, therefore, made a proposal on April 1 8 which was sanctioned by the Army Command on the 2oth, that the Georgette attack should be abandoned. Only Mt. Kemmel, and, by order of the Higher Command, the much- fought-over villages of Festubert and Givenchy, were still to be taken in particular Mt. Kemmel, the possession of which was
