was promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1898 and colonel in IQOO. He returned from Madagascar to France in 1902 and was given com- mand of the i4th Regt. of Hussars. On Oct. 9 1903 he was pro- moted general of brigade and four years later (July 30 1907) was made a substantive divisional general and placed in command of theOran division. On April 28 1912 he was appointed resident general and commissioner in Morocco an appointment which he held continuously until Dec. 1916, when he relinquished it, against his own wish, to become Minister for War under M. Briand's premiership. He resigned his portfolio in March 1917 and thereby precipitated the fall of the Briand Cabinet. He then returned to continue his work in Morocco. He was admit- ted to the French Academy in 1912. He received the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour on Sept. 17 1913, and was made a marshal of France in Feb. 1921 in reward for his great services as a soldier-proconsul in that N. African empire which many Frenchmen regard as the future basis of their national power.
LYDEKKER, RICHARD (1849-1915), English naturalist and geologist, was born in London July 25 1849. He entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where he took a first-class in the Natural Science tripos (1871). He joined the staff of the geological sur- vey of India in 1874, remaining in this post till 1882. He became very widely known as a naturalist, and was elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1894. His works include Catalogues (in 10 vols.) of the fossil mammals, reptiles and birds in the British Museum (1891); A Manual of Palaeontology (with Prof. H. A. Nicholson, 2 vols., 1889); Phases of Animal Life (1892); The Royal Natural History (with Sir W. H. Fowler, 8 vols., 1893-6); The Great and Small Game of India, Burma and Tibet (1900). He died at Harpenden April 16 1915.
LYONS, SIR JOSEPH (1848-1917), British caterer, was born in London Sept. 29 1848 and educated at the Borough Jewish school. In early life he studied painting and exhibited at the Royal Institute, but by 1886 he had turned to business enter- prises, in conjunction with the brothers Isidore (d. 1920) and Montagu Gluckstein. He began by catering at public exhibi- tions. He next opened tea-shops in London, the first in 1894; 20 years later these numbered over 200 and provided cheap food for the large class of clerical workers and junior members of pro- fessions. Later he opened several restaurants of a more ambi- tious nature, as well as hotels on the "no-tipping" principle. He initiated the athletic side of the Territorial Army scheme, and, for his services in this direction, was knighted in 1911. He died in London June 22 1917.
See Mrs. Stuart Menzies, Modern Men of Mark (1920).
LYS, BATTLE OF THE (1918). In the great German offensive of 1918 the idea of breaking through the British-Portuguese front in French Flanders had from the first played a considerable part in the scheme of attack considered by Rupprecht's group of armies. Under the code name " George," this was originally intended as the operation to force a decision, but it shrank later as " Little George " (" Georgette ") to a diversion, and was eventually dropped altogether in favour of the " Michael " operation (see WESTERN FRONT CAMPAIGNS). Only the preparations for it were carried out, immediately before the main attack in the Somme area, to mislead the opponent. Arrangements had also been made to revert quickly to the attack in Flanders in case the Somme offensive should come to a standstill.
When, on March 30, the great battle in France actually was broken off, the German Supreme Command snatched at the Flanders attack now " Georgette " which was limited in extent. There the second blow was to be struck at the British army. They could not expect to decide the war here, where the means were considerably more scanty than in the March offensive, but they hoped for a break-through in the direction of St. Omer- Hazebrouck and considerable gains of ground towards the coast. An extension of the break-through towards the S. was a secondary consideration only.
The conditions were favourable to carrying out the operation. The dry weather held out hopes that the Lys plain would prove practicable. The Portuguese, put in S. of Armentieres, were inferior as opponents, and the Flanders front had had an extraor-
dinarily weakening effect on the British. Everything depended on whether the Lys depression, which was difficult to traverse and impossible to reconnoitre, could be conquered so quickly as to prevent renewed resistance on the river itself, and the use of the rising ground beyond the Lys and the Lawe for the defence.
The maiii German attack was entrusted to the VI. Army under von Quast, with the Corps Staffs II. B, XIX., LV. and IV. For this purpose the Army was to put in 17 divisions in all. The attack was to be led from the line Armentieres-La Bassee canal, with its centre of gravity on Hazebrouck. The IV. Army under Sixt von Armin, in the event of the VI. Army's attack having sufficient success, was to advance with a strong left wing to the W., passing N. of Armentieres, which in itself was to be left untouched and made to fall by envelopment. Four divisions of the IV. Army, under the Staffs of the X. and XVIII. Reserve Corps, were to take part in the attack. The further development of the attack was. to depend upon whether the heights S. of Po- peringhe could be reached. If this were achieved the British and Belgians would be threatened from the rear, and their evacuation of the positions stretching northwards to Dixmude could be counted upon, if the subsidiary attacks arranged for by the IV. Army at this town and from the Houthoulst forest were carried out. The destruction of the important mining and industrial centre in the Bethune region might also be expected if the left wing, in accordance with the progress of the centre, should wheel in to the south-west. It was particularly important here, as in the March offensive, to succeed in really surprising the enemy. The successful crossing of the Lys especially depended on this. Emphasis was therefore laid on the need for the utmost haste. April 8 was the date desired for the attack, but in the end the VI. Army's attack had to be postponed till the gth. The IV. Army's attack was fixed for the loth.
The armies made their preparations with the greatest zeal and with scrupulous care, guided by the same principles as in the attack in the Somme area. By direction of the Supreme Army Command the artillery programme was revised by Colonel Bruchmuller. The order of battle gave the VI. Army nine divi- sions in the first, five in the second, and three in the third line; the IV. Army had three divisions in the first and one in the second line. The first- and second-line divisions were placed under the Corps Staffs, the third-line divisions under the Army Higher Command. To reenforce the attack still further, 14 more divisions were specially sent in the course of the battle, 9 by the army group, s by the Supreme Army Command. On an average the troops used were inferior to those in the March offensive. Quite a number of them were not fitted out and trained as attack divisions. But in spite of this both leaders and troops were full of confidence.
The attack itself was prepared by the artillery in the same way as that of March 21. Gas-shelling by the VI. Army began at 4:15 A.M., and, according to British reports, succeeded in poisoning the ground for miles behind the British front line. The deployment of the infantry had been carried out without any serious counter-measures on the part of the enemy. At 8:45 A.M. the infantry passed to the assault, meeting with only slight resistance, but found themselves, like the artillery, hindered by the mist hanging over the Lys depression, which greatly hampered their leading and the communication of information. In spite of this all three lines of the first position had been passed by 10 A.M. But now came thce great problem of crossing the area under shell-fire with artillery and transport. The roads ran unfavourably, and were almost all destroyed. The ground was still soft in many places, and the shell-holes full of water. A few downpours of rain shortly before the day of the attack had made the condition of the ground worse. In spite of the immediate sending forward of pioneers and engineers and of the devoted zeal they put into their work it was only possible to effect a gradual improvement and to make at least the more important roads passable. On the first day only some few guns were got up to the front, in immediate support of the attacking infantry. This difficulty was distinctly felt when fresh resistance was encountered on the Lys. Nevertheless the initial success was
