made a valiant attempt to improve both the quality and quan- tity of her wool, and succeeded in both objects to a certain extent. In Australia certain developments of sheep-growing districts are to be noted, but these, with the increase in the weights of the individual fleeces, probably only just served to balance losses through drought and in other directions. Falk- land Island wool (fine crossbred) made a name for itself as a good hosiery wool, but unfortunately the increase up to 1914 was not great. S. America generally proved disappointing, in view of the demand for its wools, not only from the European con- tinent but also from Great Britain, following the decline in the prejudice against them.
Undoubtedly the greatest wool problem prior to the war was the provision of a sufficient quantity of fine merino wool. This TABLE 5. New Zealand Wool.
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Total Sheep
Merinos
1910
1917
1920
23,480,707 25,270,386 23,914,506
1,868,805 1,063,491 803,589
is illustrated in Table 5. S. Africa partly met this deficiency, but Australia pinned her faith on mutton rather than on wool, so that the tendency to eliminate the pure-bred merino is still in evidence.
So far as the distribution of the wool manufacturing industry was concerned there was an undoubted tendency in Britain to relinquish wool manufacture owing to severe competition. The continental European competition took the form of efficiency in manipulation and excellence in the goods produced. How Yorkshire was going to face the importation of certain conti- nental goods was a problem and one that had still to be faced after the war. The competition with the United States was apparently controlled by the tariff charges, but it is more than probable that the excellence of American manufactured goods was already beginning to tell against European importations; although America still had to start her export trade. York- shire, however, appeared to be falling between two stools she was not producing goods of the excellence of the continental styles and thereby forcing a way into neutral markets; nor was she organized on such a scale that she could face the United States' markets indeed the American manufacturers were surpassing her in scale of organization. It would not be over- stating the case to say that the year 1914 opened with many misgivings so far as the British wool manufacturing industry was concerned. The war came, and temporarily dominated every- thing. But the conditions of 1914 were likely to reappear afterwards, and would have to be faced sooner or later.
II. THE WAR PERIOD (1914 to 1918)
The Slump in Trade. Fear of the unknown naturally created the trade slump observable during the early months of the World War. Britain, a country whose very life depended upon the importation of the raw material and exportation of the semi- manufactured or fully manufactured article, naturally had most to fear. This fear was further aggravated by the fact that British manufacturers had huge financial interests involved with Germany; and, conversely, Germany had financial interests with Britain. With trade universally in a state of suspended anima- tion, and the sequence of delivery of goods and payment of accounts seriously interfered with, many British firms and especially those in the wool, top and yarn trade were at once in serious financial difficulties. The Government, however, tided over the difficulty by the " moratorium," which, by the " time easement " given, enabled the greater proportion of firms eventually to meet their liabilities.
A period of suspense followed, during which the exact trend of many matters was being worked out. By the middle of 1915, however, the idea that, when the British and French armies got going, they would sweep the Germans back into the Father- land, had practically gone. In the meantime Germany had been swept from the seas. It was now evident that Germany, from the wool point of view, would have to be self-contained,.
neither importing raw wool * nor exporting manufactured goods; that France was seriously incapacitated_ as .a manufacturing country owing to the invasion of much of her manufacturing territory; that Russia would seriously have to draw upon British stocks of manufactured goods; in fact, that Britain must be the mainstay of the Allies and of the world, with the exception of the United States and Japan so far as wool manufactured goods were concerned. The extent to which Germany deliberately crippled France both during the war period and subsequently will be realized from the following quotation from the Yorkshire Observer in March 1921:
" The Fourraies District remained practically the whole time away from actual fighting range and did not suffer from gunfire, but, this notwithstanding, the destruction by hammer, pick, dyna- mite and fire was complete, the Fourmies woollen plants having always proved most serious competitors of those of Germany. The enemy reached the district on Aug. 26 1914, and left it on Nov. 9 1918. When they arrived there were 75 textile works in full activity ; they destroyed all except five worsted spinning plants, one woollen spinning plant and one combing plant. The steam engines were broken or otherwise damaged ; the boilers removed and rendered unserviceable, the safes were broken into and all records of manufacture, samples, reference data, representing 30 years of activity, removed to Germany. . . . Immediately the Germans occupied the northern departments of France, not a single wool- combing machine was left throughout the country ; there remained in activity throughout the land only 160,000 worsted spindles out of 2,400,000; only half the total of 700,000 woollen spindles; only about 11,000 weaving looms out of 56,000."
By 1916, two other factors had come into play. The drain' on the man-power of Great Britain was becoming serious. But it was now fully revealed that in the wool industry there was a vast surplus of labour ready to maintain output, at least at a very high rate. By April, scarcity of shipping was threatened. Thus early in 1916, if the serious limitation of the supply of raw materials was not actually felt, it was in sight.
The Difficulties Leading to Wool Control. The British War Office, having in the very early days of the war experienced the difficulty of clothing in khaki the large army in course of forma- tion, organized itself to overcome this difficulty, and by the in- evitable restrictions indirectly placed on the manufacture of civilian clothing had so far succeeded fairly well in its direct object. But by the early days of 1916 the War Office was seri- ously alarmed at the future prospects of supplies of raw mate- rials and sought outside advice. As illustrating the method of working the following may be taken as typical. On Feb. i 1916 a War Office official (who, incidentally, knew nothing of wool) visited the university of Leeds and asked for certain estimates respecting British combs and spindles, to be' supplied to him four days later when the Army Council would meet to discuss supplies. In Table 6 the figures then supplied are given^ and alongside the estimates are given also the actual figures, kindly supplied some years later by the same official. The estimate for 1916 was 337,500,000 lb., as against an actual production of 309,443,185 lb., based on the first half of 1917.
The following figures were also supplied on the same date:
Wool available for use in the United Kingdom . 800,000,000 lb. Less clothing wools used in the woollen trade . . 200,000,000 lb.
Available for combing .
Less shrinkage and tearage in scouring and comb-
. 600,000,000 lb.
ing (40%)
. 240,000,000 lb.
Wool available for " tops " 360,000,000 lb.
The estimated shrinkage and tearage of 40 % would have been, much too low as average Australian merino .gives a shrinkage of about 50% and a tearage of from 5 to i to 8 to i but for the endeavour made to save shipping space by shipping in the scoured state only, and by reason of the large quantities of washed home-grown wools and low-yielding colonial crossbreds included. The effect of this is clearly shown (Table 7) in Mr. Norman Rae's figures published in the Yorkshire Observer of Friday, Aug. 10 1917. From these figures it is evident - (a) that the Government by 1917 had fears of being unable to
1 With the exception noted with reference to Russian wools.
