of Messines toward Passchendaele. Up there the line had only been advanced a few hundred yards as a result of two regularly prepared attacks. Unles% progress could be expedited at this critical point, there was little prospect of achieving the object for which the offensive had been undertaken. It was clear that a fresh force was needed to deal with the enemy in this portion of the sphere of operations, and the British commander-in-chief therefore decided to extend the left of the II. Army northward and to entrust the attacks against the higher ground to General Plumer, who was to work in conjunction with the V. Army farther to the left. Experiences gained on July 31 and Aug. 16 had moreover shown that new methods of attack were called for. The enemy's elastic system of defence forward trenches weakly held while formidable reserves were kept in hand to counter-attack before assailants could consolidate such ground as they had won suggested limitation in the depth of objectives, and it called for special artillery concentrations to deal with the hostile counter-strokes when they were delivered. The requisite measures took some time to carry out and the weather moreover continued unfavourable during the latter part of Aug., rendering the ground so waterlogged that a long interval became necessary to permit of its drying to some extent. In Flanders it may be remarked, as in England, humidity of the atmosphere increases rapidly from about the middle of Aug. onward, so that periods of fine weather have less and less effect in absorbing the moisture of the ground as the season advances. The first half of Sept. however, proved bright and dry and the date of the next attack was fixed for the 2oth of that month.
The plan of operations for this day was that the II. Army (consisting from right to left of the ipth, 39th, 4ist, 23rd, Australian ist and 2nd Divs.) was to push forward between the Ypres-Comines canal and a point a few hundreds yards S. of the Ypres-Roulers railway, while the V. Army (consisting from right to left of the gth, 55th, 58th, 5ist and zoth Divs.) was to press forward on its left to as far N. as the Ypres-Staden railway. At no point was it proposed to gain more than a mile of ground in depth, and, except about the Ypres-Menin road and im- mediately to the N. of this, the furthest objectives given to the various divisions were not more than half a mile in advance of the existing line. The weather unfortunately broke during the night of the igth-2oth; but in spite of this the attacks achieved their object all along the front and the efforts of the II. Army were crowned with brilliant success 1 in a sector where previous attempts had to a great extent failed, the crest of the main ridge on either side of the Ypres-Menin road being wrested from the enemy. The V. Army likewise appreciably improved its position. The losses of the attacking side on this day were relatively small, in view of the importance of what had been achieved, and 3,243 prisoners and several guns were taken.
Sir D. Haig followed up the success of the 2oth without delay. A fresh thrust took place along a more restricted length of front on the 26th, from about half a mile S. of the Menin road to a point about a mile and a half N. of the Ypres-Roulers railway. The forces detailed for the enterprise, enumerating them from right to left, were the sgth, 33rd, Australian 5th and 4th Divs. of the II. Army, and the 3rd, sgth and s8th Divs. of the V. Army. The Germans had in the meantime been making desperate attempts to recover some of the ground which they had lost about the Menin road and Polygon wood, but without success; and in spite of their resolute opposition they were unable to pre- vent the British troops from attaining practically the whole of their objectives on the 26th. The rest of Polygon wood was captured, the British position was improved all along the line, and i, 600 prisoners were taken. That the losses should have been by no means heavy on this day as on the 2oth showed how effective an answer the method of the shallow objective provided to the enemy's new plan of defence by depth. The combats of Sept. 20 and 26 having given almost the entire crest of the main ridge into British hands to a depth of a mile and a half in advance of the line taken up on July 31, Sir D. Haig arranged for a very important operation to take place on Oct. 4, the front this time extending from Polygon wood to the Ypres-Staden rail-
way, although a minor advance was also to take place S. of Polygon wood and S. of the Menin road.
There was a severe gale accompanied by torrents of rain during the night of the 3rd, and the weather conditions on the following morning were so unfavourable that the ground was in most parts of the battle-field little better than a morass. The enemy moreover was in great strength, especially in the centre; two fresh divisions had been brought up into the German line and, as it happened, these together with the troops already on the spot were drawn up ready to deliver an assault which was timed to start ten minutes later than the hour that had been fixed for the British advance. The consequence was that when the British artillery barrage opened it caught hostile forces that were gathered in mass and it did great execution. The order of battle of the II. and V. Armies was as follows: 37th Div. of the IX. Corps on the extreme right, athwart the Menin road, then the X. Corps (5th, 2ist, 7th Divs.) covering the front up to in front of Polygon wood, then the I. Anzac Corps (ist and 2nd Australian Divs.) reaching as far as the Ypres-Roulers railway, and, on their left again and forming the left of the II. Army, the II. Anzac Corps (Australian 3rd Div. and New Zealand Div.) ; the V. Army was represented by the XVIII. Corps (48th and nth Divs.) next to the II. Anzac Corps, with the XIV. Corps (4th and 2gth Divs.) on the extreme left. The attacking side gained a signal victory this day. Nearly all its objectives were secured, and the gains were especially important in the centre where a firm footing was won along the main ridge about the villages of Molenaarelsthoek and Broodesinde for a length of a mile and a half; a gentle spur stretching back north-westward from this and known as the Gravenstafel ridge was also wholly secured. A hold was gained further to the left on the important village of Poelkapelle on the Ypres-Roulers road; and along all the central part of the zone of operations the assailants pushed their line forward several hundred yards, thereby taking pos- session of ground of great tactical importance. 5,200 prisoners were taken, including 138 officers, and, besides a few guns, a large number of machine-guns and trench mortars were amongst the day's captures. Following as it did rapidly upon the suc- cesses of Sept. 20 and 26, the combat of Oct. 4 represented a highly satisfactory achievement, which had moreover been accomplished without very heavy sacrifice. It was not in- deed the losses encountered in these well-defined actions that gave grounds for anxiety so much as the casualties which occurred day after day to troops that were clinging to exposed positions, where owing to the condition of the ground it was almost impossible to create effective cover.
A good defensive line had however now been secured. As a result of the offensive operations begun by General Plumer on June 7 and continued intermittently for four months, the crest of the long belt of high ground had been occupied from Messines to within a very few hundred yards of the Ypres-Roulers railway and the situation of the Allies in Flanders had been vastly improved in consequence. Possession of the Gravenstafel ridge would moreover enable Sir D. Haig to establish a strong flanking position, which would render it difficult for the Germans to recover the high ground they had lost by a turning movement from the N. But, regarding the Allied offensive in this part of the theatre of war as a whole, the work was in reality only begun. The Houthulst forest, with the long line of high ground forming the quadrant of a circle beyond it, was still in the enemy's hands. Until the ridge had been secured as far as the vicinity of Staden, it would be premature to embark on the second part of the general scheme of operations attack on the German positions along the coast between Nicuport and Ostend. Sir D. Haig had now to decide whether he should continue his system of gradual advance N.E. of Ypres, or should call a halt.
" The year was far spent," he writes in his despatch. " The weather had been consistently unpropitious, and the state of the ground, in consequence of rain and shelling combined, made movement inconceivably difficult. The resultant delays had given the enemy time to bring up reinforcements and to organize his defence after each defeat. Even so, it was still the difficulty
