of movement far more than hostile resistance which continued to limit our progress, and which now made it doubtful whether the capture of the remainder of the ridge before winter finally set in was possible. On the other hand there was no reason to anticipate an abnormally wet October. The enemy had suffered severely, as was evidenced by the number of prisoners in our hands, by the costly failure of his repeated counter-attacks, and by the symptoms of confusion and discouragement in his ranks. . . . After weighing these considerations, as well as the general situa- tion and various other factors affecting the problem, among them the desirability of assisting our Allies in the operations to be carried out by them on Oct. 23 in the neighbourhood of Mal- maison, I decided to continue the offensive further and to renew the advance at the earliest possible moment consistent with adequate preparation."
That the British commander-in-chief in arriving at this de- cision was largely governed by considerations to which expres- sion could not appropriately be given in a despatch sent in so early as Dec. 25 1917, there can be little doubt. However fa- vourable Oct. weather might be, the whole of the ridge together with the Houthulst forest was most unlikely to fall into the Allies' hands before the winter set in. The persistent rains had had too great an effect upon the soil for this to recover from it before the spring, even if the rest of the autumn were to be dry and favourable. For the offensive plan, as originally con- ceived, to be carried out in its entirety even in an ordinary season, Sir D. Haig's forces ought to have attained the positions which they had only secured by Oct. 4, at least two months earlier. But he was aware that the fighting capacity of the French armies was for the moment diminished by grave internal troubles, the Russian collapse had set free large hostile forces which were being rapidly transferred to the western front, and if the British offensive ceased, the enemy would regain the initia- tive and would be free to assail the French front wherever this happened to be weakest. It followed that the British, in spite of the difficulties in the way, must continue their offensive until the coming of winter put an end for the time being to the danger of a German counter-attack.
The hopes which had been entertained at G.H.Q. that Oct. might bring dry weather after the heavy rains experienced in Aug. and Sept., were doomed to disappointment. The days immediately following the combat of Oct. 4 proved worse than ever, and the troops suffered great hardships besides losing many men from hostile shell-fire owing to the lack of protection ; they had to trust for shelter to shallow trenches hastily scooped out to join together adjacent shell-holes. The enemy however had been so roughly handled on the 4th that any counter- attacks which were attempted from the hostile lines had little force in them. In spite of the unfavourable climatic conditions a fresh attack was arranged for Oct. 9, the front on this oc- casion extending from about the Ypres-Roulers railway to the extreme left near Merckem. The order of battle of the II. and V. Armies was as follows: Anzac I. Corps (Australian I.), Anzac II. Corps (66th and 49th Divs.), representing the II. Army; XVIII. Corps (46th, 48th and nth Divs.), XIV. Corps (4th, 29th and Guards Divs.), representing the V. Army. On the left of these again was the French I. Army. The night of the 8th was particularly dark, there was heavy rain, and considerable trouble was met with in mustering the troops for the assault so that this was carried out under conditions of extraordinary difficulty. The advance was on this day, in accordance with the programme, pushed farthest forward on the left and about the left centre. The outskirts of the Houthulst forest were gained by the French in spite of much of the low-lying ground being actually under water, and the British troops on their right made good the ground to a depth of a mile and a half about Lange- marck. On the right the assailants were strongly opposed and lost heavily, but they nevertheless gained their objectives along most of their front. 2,100 prisoners in all were taken, with a few guns, and the day's operations could be reckoned as representing a substantial success, if at heavy cost.
A fresh advance was attempted on Oct. 12 in spite of a con-
tinuance of the bad weather and of the , ground being in a terrible state. It should be mentioned that in all this later fight- ing forming part of the great Flandters offensive, the Allied infantry were seriously handicapped by lack of heavy gun support. In such a sea of mud the larger types of howitzer could not be got forward, and in spite of bold and skilful handling the field artillery did not provide an effective substitute. With the Germans it was different. Their heavy ordnance when it was required to move was generally traversing ground that had not been torn up by months of shell-fire and where roads were still in being. The front of attack covered on the i2th was approx- imately the same as that covered on the gih and the objectives given to the various divisions only called for an advance of a comparatively short distance; but many of the lower valleys were found to be absolutely impassable owing to the floods, and the operation eventually was not persisted in at most points. 1,000 prisoners were taken, but the attacking side lost heavily, and, although the unsatisfactory result of the effort from the British point of view was attributable to the elements rather than to the enemy, this day's fighting amounted to an undoubted reverse to the cause of the Allies.
All hope of making any appreciable gains of ground except in one particular sector was now abandoned by G.H.Q. , although the front was slightly pushed forward in the region of the Houthulst forest by dint of some skilfully carried out minor operations during the next few days. The one sector where it was determined to continue the offensive was the ground between the Ypres-Roulers railway and the neighbourhood of Poelkapelle. The II. Army was in possession of the crest of the ridge about Broodseinde and where the railway traverses this; but further to the left the line ran diagonally across the rear- ward slope of the heights and was commanded from these 'at short range. Having once pushed forward beyond the front that had been taken up as a result of the successful combat of Oct. 4, it had become almost imperative to secure possession of the village of Passchendaele as well as some rising ground immediately to the N. and N.W. of that place, and to arrange that the line should run back in a westerly direction from this point, at right angles to, and not diagonally across, the ridge. This would create a sharp salient; but Passchendaele was a com- manding point, and the lie of the ground between it and Poel- kapelle would favour the establishment of a strong defensive line for the winter. Sir D. Haig therefore decided to continue the offensive immediately to the N. of the Ypres-Roulers rail- way on a narrow front, and in order to give this a fresh impetus he brought the Canadian Corps round from Lens. A number of readjustments of the order of battle of the II. and V. Armies also took place, for some of the troops about Ypres were required for the offensive secretly prepared in the Cambrai region.
The weather after Oct. 12 showed distinct signs of improve- ment, although at this late season of the year there could be no hope of the saturated soil recovering very appreciably from the effects of those abnormal autumn rains which had proved the most formidable antagonist of the Allies in Belgian Flanders. But the signs proved delusive, for on the asth, the very day before a fresh attack had been arranged, heavy rain set in again. This operation only covered the front between the Ypres-Roulers railway and Poelkapelle, the main advance being intended to take place in the right centre and right. The troops detailed for the undertaking were, enumerating them from right to left, the Australian ist Div., the Canadian 4th and 3rd Divs., the 63rd Div., and part of the s8th Div. But what amounted to an independent operation (except in that it must occupy the enemy's attention on a part of the front only about 2 m. from the main attack) was also undertaken on this day by the 5th and 7th Divs. on either side of the Ypres-Menin road. In spite of unfavourable weather and the deplorable state of the ground important progress was made by the Australian and Canadian troops, the latter getting up close to Passchendaele and successfully withstanding heavy counter-attacks in most portions of the ground which they had won. The 6jrd and $8th Divs. also reached their objectives; but they were not called
