But by the middle of 1916 the British force in France considered itself completely organized. In munitions it was better supplied than any other force in the field. It had taken over control of its own railway services, supplementing the French broad- gauge railway system, which it had taken over and increased, it had a system of light railways and a greatly increased scale of motor transport. But the Somme battle showed many se- rious weaknesses. Supply had been increased beyond the scale that transport could cope with. There followed in Nov. 1916 a reorganization of the system. One feature of this organiza- tion was good. The division of authority, which put the admin- istrative services under two heads, one for the battle area and one for lines of communication, was done away with. The military railways, which had been hitherto starved, were reor- ganized, and were generously supplied with staff and material. But what proved in the result to be a mistake in organization was made: railways were separated from the control of the quartermaster-general (who kept control of other forms of transport), and put under an independent directorate of trans- portation. Thus the commander-in-chief had two separate transport authorities to deal with.
There followed after the battle of the Somme a period when the line was practically stable for a long period; and whilst the almost stationary trench warfare continued, the weakness of this division of authority, and the mistake of allowing any but the military idea to rule in an essential part of the army organ- ization, were not apparent. When the Germans attacked in the spring of 1918 those errors showed very clearly, and the railways had to be brought again under the control of the quartermaster- general, after an interval during which they were under a com- mittee of the staff. But the transport situation then was very critical. The German advance had brought the British front lateral line St. Just-Amiens-St. Pol-Hazebrouck under shell- fire at many points. The Germans, whose strategy under Gen. Ludendorff was dominated largely by transport considerations, sought to paralyze completely the whole railway system by con- tinuous air-attack on the British rear lateral Eu-Abbeville Etaples, especially at the points where it crossed the rivers Canche and Somme. Whole-hearted work in building " avoiding " lines and bridges, and the efforts of the motor transport, just kept the position in hand until a British advance in front of Amiens relieved the front lateral. It was a happy circumstance that a new quartermaster-general of the British army in France, Lt.- Gen. Sir Travers Clarke, had just brought to completion the building up of a G.H.Q. reserve of motor lorries. He thought in the winter of 1917-8 that the battle of Passchendaele had exposed a weakness in light railways that they had to work along defined tracks which could be intensively shelled by the enemy. The British army therefore decided to trust more to the motor transport. There was effected a complete reorganization of it, with the central idea of doing away as far as possible with the " earmarking " of motor vehicles for particular units or particular tasks, and making its total strength completely mobile and liquid. Vehicles saved by this " pooling " were formed into a G.H.Q. Motor Reserve. This proved of great strategical benefit in the spring of 1918. The G.H.Q. Motor Reserve was able then to take up part of the traffic load, and was largely responsible for saving the situation. There were lorry drivers who held the wheel for 36 hours at a stretch, and were lifted from their seats fainting or asleep; a few who carried on until no longer able to see through their bloodshot eyes ran their cars into trees or walls or ditches. There were many cas- ualties, but the situation was saved at a time when the railways could not meet the work of supply.
Passchendaele, terrible ordeal as it was for the British army, gave valuable hints as to the proper place of light railways in an administrative system. Light railways at one stage of the war were perhaps over-estimated. There was an inclination to regard them as all-sufficing. The British administrative services ultimately gave them their proper role, recognizing that they were most valuable when the line of battle was stabilized for same length of time, but tended to be less valuable as the war
became one of movement. In the spring of 1918, the British army had 920 m. of light railways in operation; in the summer 100 m. less. Its great advance was planned on the principle of concentrating labour upon pushing forward the bfoad-gauge railways and the roads forward from them, trusting to motor transport and to horse transport to carry on the load from broad-gauge railhead. Earlier in 1918 controversy on the sub- ject was keen, and the French were inclined to take a differing view. The Germans, of course, were tied to light railways, for they had not the. means to extend their motor traction. The position on Nov. n 1918 seemed to justify the British view.
By the summer of 1918 the British administrative services were so confident of their machine that they were supporting strongly in favour of trying for a " knock-out blow " as against the alternative plan of devoting the winter to final preparation for an overwhelming campaign in the spring of 1919. " Admin- istration " covered at this stage a wide scope. It arranged the supply, from England, and from its own workshops and local civilian workshops, of all the varied equipment of the forces, from a tank and a is-in. howitzer to a tin of dubbin. There came to the ports of France every month for the B.E.F. about 800,000 tons of material. The men to be fed totalled over 2,000,000 and the animals about 500,000. The transport sys- tem in addition to half-a-million horses and mules, had about 20,000 motor lorries running over 9,000,000 motor miles per month ; it carried on its light railways about 544,000 tons a month, and ran every day 250 trains on its broad-gauge lines. It was constantly building new railways and new roads, and developing new harbour facilities. It ran canal and sea barge services, forestry and agricultural services, and repair shops, on a gigantic scale. It supplied the medical stores for wounded and sick, the veterinary services, the laboratories for the defence of men and animals against poison-gas and for the gas counter-offensive. In the last year of the war it produced timber from French forests for four-fifths of its total needs. It grew vegetables and other food and fodder stuffs, and helped as tiller and harvester in the French fields (in 1918 it saved the crops on 18,000 acres., harvesting at night, the soldiers having to work sometimes in gas masks). It was its tailor, bootmaker, laundryman and even ragpicker. The soldier on going out of the line had clean under- wear waiting for him at his divisional baths; his soiled garments were disinfected, cleaned and repaired for reissue; his socks darned, buttons replaced, rents patched; and the garment beyond repair was shipped away as rags for the shoddy mills of Dewsbury.
This administrative army was caterer for men and horses. The civilian world throughout Europe might be suffering from scarcity of food supplies, but to the very last the British soldiers and horses enjoyed good rations. This was only made pos- sible by an organization that eliminated every form of waste.
As banker this administration dealt with every currency and note-issue of the world. It had savings banks and an invest- ment organization for British troops, and even special savings banks for the Chinese. It insured its civilian labourers against death and accident; it negotiated the payment of octroi to towns where its troops were stationed, and paid compensation of French property owners for the leases of their lands and build- ings and the war damage to their property.
The Complexity of Administration. This wide range of activ- ities, though it had to be carried on under conditions which varied from day to day, fell with minor variations into three main categories, (i) Maintaining a stabilized position. This was comparatively easy. The traffic demand was known. Wastage of horses and material could be calculated with some certainty and replaced by a routine process. (2) Preparing a big attack. This made the greatest strain on transport and supply, and the necessary conditions of secrecy added complica- tions. In preparing an offensive the traffic tonnage more than doubled per division. This was due to the necessity for making new railways and new roads, and the accumulation of defence material to fortify a new line. But the accumulation of ammuni- tion was also a factor. On a quiet sector two divisions could be
