served by three trains daily. For the preparation of a big attack ten divisions might be concentrated on that sector, and those divisions in the preparatory stage of the attack would need about 33 supply trains a day, and during the offensive about 27 trains a day. And these trains would carry material only to broad-gauge railhead. After that most of it had to go farther forward by light railway, motor and horse traffic, and in some cases even by the " Yukon pack," i.e. by man porterage. (3) Resisting a big attack. The difficult element here was its unex- pectedness. The amount of supplies per division necessary to go up from base would be 25% less than in the case of the prepa- ration of a big offensive. There was always carried a good reserve of ammunition, food and engineering stores, close behind the line, and a further reserve of ammunition already loaded on trains at appropriate railway centres. In case of emergency, ammunition could start to move up as soon as a locomotive could be coupled to a standing train. The German offensive in 1918 showed that the British carried near the front line too great reserves, and there were unnecessary losses in food, stores and ammunition, as a consequence. Forward " dumps " were thereafter reduced.
The organization at the front in 1918 to cope with this work in the British army, had at its head the quartermaster-general (Lt.-Gen. Sir Travers Clarke) and two deputy quartermaster- generals (Maj.-Gen. Ford and Maj.-Gen. May). The head- quarters staff consisted of about 40 officers, and the detailed work was divided under the following departments: Director of Agricultural Production (Brig.-Gen. Earl of Radnor) ; Director of Army Postal Services (Brig.-Gen. Price); Deputy Controller of Canteens (Col. E. Benson); Director of Engineering Stores (Brig.-Gen. Sewell); Director of Forestry (Brig.-Gen. Lord Lovat); Director of Hirings and Requisitions and President of Claims Commission (Maj.-Gen. L. B. Friend); Controller of Labour (Brig.-Gen. Wace); Director of Ordnance Services (Maj.- Gen. Sir C. M. Mathew); Paymaster-in-chief (Maj.-Gen. Sir C. A. Bray) ; Director of Remounts (Brig.-Gen. Sir F. S. Garrett) ; Controller of Salvage (Brig.-Gen. Alexander Gibb); Director of Supplies (Maj.-Gen. Carter); Director of Motor Transport (Maj.-Gen. Boyce) ; Director-General of Transportation (Maj.- Gen. Crookshank); Director of Veterinary Services (Maj.-Gen. Moore); Vice-Chairman Imperial War Graves Commission (Maj.-Gen. Fabian Ware); Director of Works (Maj.-Gen. Sir A. M. Stuart). Subsidiary directorates under the Director- General of Transportation were: Director of Construction (Brig.-Gen. Stewart); Director of Docks (Brig.-Gen. Wedge- wood); Director of Inland Water Transport (Brig.-Gen. Luck); Director of Light Railways (Brig.-Gen. Harrison); Railway Traffic (Brig.-Gen. Murray); Roads (Brig.-Gen. Maybury).
A comparison of this organization with the French administra- tive services would suggest that the British was over-elaborate. But consideration must be given to these important facts: that the British army was operating in a foreign country, and more- over in the country of an Ally where there must be the least possible friction with the inhabitants; that by custom both men and animals in the British force required a particularly gener- ous ration; that the British force expended far more ammuni- tion than the French, and in its campaign methods kept up a permanent minor offensive even on quiet sectors, as was not the custom with the French. When in the course of the operations early in 1918, French and British troops were intermixed in the battle line, it was found by experience impracticable to supply British units through the French system, and, except as regards such items as hay and petrol, which were kept in a common pool, the supply and transport had to be duplicated, a British system being set up side by side with a French.
Salvage. An account of the administrative system in the World War would be incomplete without some reference to the salvage activities of 1917-8. The submarine war began to have its cumu- lative effect just when there came the most peremptory reminders that supply was going to be the determining factor of the final struggle. Munitions, food, equipment, railways, roads, ships these had become the most important factors, and victory would incline to thejorce which could best concentrate the means to maintain an
overwhelming force at some particular point, and could best develop, conserve, and transport its material. From 1915 to the middle of
1917 it was only necessary for the British army to ask and it re- ceived. Later in 1917, and in 1918, there came requisitions which could not be met. Just before the German attack in 1918 (to give one example) there were desperate calls for barbed wire, to make up an actual shortage of 8,000 tons in the minimum requirements for safety; but it was not available. In food, forage, clothing, timber, metals, the world-shortage had now become acute. The adminis- trative services of all armies sought to better their position, in Europe, by the organization of a department of salvage. As the British salvage department explained, " the shortage of almost every kind of raw material used for war supplies makes salvage an important administrative service. Without a well-organized and thorough salvage system, the full maintenance of our force in the field would be made difficult .... The salvage organization is not intended to take the place of, or in any way discourage, a consistent effort on the part of every supply department to recover for repair and re-issue its own articles and its own empties. It is intended to supplement that effort; to collect and put to use what would other- wise become derelict ; to insure that nothing utilizable is allowed 1o go to waste. . . . There is nothing of the debris of the battlefield which we cannot put to some use." Some of the items of salvage values taken from a monthly return show the wide range of the department swill for piggeries, 600; solder from old tins, 300; cotton waste, 500; tin-plate (won by unrolling old biscuit tins, etc.), 2,500; old lead, 400; various by-products 200,000. The old rags collected did a great deal to help the cloth shortage at home. The old bones collected made glycerine for explosives. In Sept.
1918 the British army saved 4,000,000, and the American army 3,000,000 by salvage.
The Animals of the Force. The administration of the animals of the British force the largest mobilization of animals known to history calls for a special note. The worst difficulty in their case was mud. From early in autumn until late in spring the mud season lasted. Off the pave roads all the fighting area of Flanders was semi- liquid, and the problem at horse-lines was first to secure a solid " standing," next to secure a solid road in and out to that standing, and finally to secure a solid road to and from a solid watering-place. Standings were usually made of bricks, and the army requisitioned all the brick yards in the occupied area. Shell-ruined villages were another source of brick supply. The bricks had to be set properly; rubble was lost in the soil within a week. Losses from enemy action were not very high among the animals until the last phase. There was little cavalry work except at the end of the campaign and at its very beginning. But horses and mules suffered greatly when the enemy began to use mustard-gas (1917-8). The ground where a mustard-gas shell had fallen was infected for long afterwards. If horses were picketed on it, or even passed over it, casualties were high. The irritant poison of the gas attacked their hoofs and their skins wherever the hair was thin and caused sloughing wounds. An effective curative treatment was found in a dressing, the chief ingredient of which was chloride of lime. From the spring of 1918 the animals suffered severe attacks from the air. The enemy devoted much of his air-force to bombing attacks on horse-lines, with a view to lessening British transport strength. At first these attacks had serious effects. Then horse-lines were camouflaged; the animals were separated into small groups ; the lines were protected by bomb- proof traverses of earthwork, which localized the effects of explosions. In the summer of 1918 the wastage of animals by sickness had been cut down to a very low rate (7-7%), as the result of skilful horse- mastership. At this time forage difficulties were acute, but there had been close organization for grading fodder in army and line-of- communication areas, and the animals always had sufficient rations. British administration was able to take a considerable part of the burden of horsing the American units which arrived in France in 1918. Nearly 25,000 animals were made available by reductions of the horse-strength of artillery units. A further 14,000 were saved by giving 6-in. howitzer and some 6o-pounder batteries mechanical transport. Another means of economy in horse flesh was the setting up of a " category B " for animals which were not quite fit for arduous work with a fighting unit, and were withdrawn to units whose de- mands on them were less exacting.
Some Comparisons. As between the three administrative machines, the French, the British, and the American in the autumn of 1918, certain points of difference may be noted. Both French and American systems still kept a dividing line as regards administration between the base and the fighting line. The British system had abolished this (together with the post of Inspector-General Lines of Communication) in 1917. The French divided the zone of the armies into the zone of the advance and the zone of supplies (with sometimes an interme- diate zone). In the zone of their advance administration was in charge of the Aide major-general charge de la direction de I'ar- riere at G.H.Q. But his administration had no functions of pro- curement, only of distribution. In some points of administra-.
