the unexpected effects of the war was a great change in immigration. Hundreds of thousands of men left the United States for Europe to join the various armies; and the countries at war were not likely to allow anybody to evade military service by going to America. Net immigration fell from 1,218,480 in 1914 to 298,826 in 1916.
Election of 1916.—In the midst of the turmoil and confusion of business and public policy caused by the war came the preliminaries of the Presidential election of 1916. The sharp difference of opinion as to the responsibility for, and the conduct of, the war was reflected in Congress, which included many ardent friends of the western Allies, others without a doubt pro-Germans, and a much larger number who desired to keep the United States out of war, no matter what happened overseas. President Wilson, though of Scotch-Irish descent and much inspired by English law and history, carefully abstained from taking sides; but the aggressive submarine policy of Germany made necessary a much sharper tone toward, and much more direct and insistent demands on, the Germans than in the case of the English. He was not only President with complete control of all diplomatic negotiations, he was the acknowledged head of the Democratic party; he was also commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. He felt the need of caution, particularly because a growing group of men inside and outside Congress, among them Roosevelt, were coming to the conclusion that eventually the United States would have to go into the war.
During the early part of 1916 the President was studiously neutral and careful. In April the little force under Pershing was withdrawn from Mexico. May 4 the President succeeded in securing from Germany the promise to refrain from submarine warfare on neutrals. In June the great national nominating conventions met, in which the attitudes of the President and his opponents upon the war were issues. As usual the Republican Convention came first, and was called in Chicago for June 7. A strong effort was made by those friends of Roosevelt who had returned to their relations with the Republican party to make him the Republican candidate. One result of the complaints regarding the Convention of 1912 was that the Republican National Committee recommended a change in the basis of representation in the Convention, which reduced the representation of those southern states in which the Republican vote was very small. Such a reduction, if made four years earlier, would have brought about Roosevelt's nomination. Nevertheless, in most of the states the “stand-pat” Republicans had control of the party machinery including the primaries, and Roosevelt showed little strength in the Convention. The Progressives, who in Nov. 1914 had cast 1,800,000 votes for Congressional and state candidates, met in convention in Chicago side by side with the Republicans. Their purpose was to make such a demonstration of strength as would compel the Republicans to nominate Roosevelt as the only means of healing the breach. That effort failed because it became evident that a large number of the Progressives throughout the country would vote for any candidate nominated by the Republican Convention who seemed likely to carry out the Progressive principles, and they gave up all hope of electing Roosevelt on a third-party ticket. The Republicans nominated Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court who had been a reform governor of New York State. No course was left to Roosevelt but to refuse the nomination offered by the Progressive Convention. The days of the Progressive party were numbered.
In the Democratic Convention, June 14, there was practically no opposition to Wilson and his running-mate Marshall. The platform in many respects was similar to that of the Republicans. Both favoured woman suffrage, conservation of national resources, and national enforcement of child-labour laws; both approved the Monroe Doctrine. But in opposition to the Republicans the Democrats upheld tariff for revenue only; they endorsed the promise of ultimate independence to the Filipinos; they commended the establishment of a Federal trade commission; and they approved a merchant marine owned and operated by the Federal Government. In the campaign Roosevelt publicly supported Hughes, though he felt no enthusiasm for him. He was more interested in questions of neutrality and in the moral support of the hard-pressed Allies than in the election. Hughes and Wilson, especially the former, canvassed the country, which was not interested in the questions of tariff and immigration but was eager to know what would be the effect of the victory of one party or another on foreign relations. The only “slogan” that caught the public ear was favourable to Wilson: “He kept us out of war.” The result was the reëlection of Wilson, who received about 9,000,000 popular votes against 8,500,000 for Hughes. The electoral vote, however, was very close and was finally decided by majorities of a few hundred in New Hampshire, Minnesota and especially California.
Peace or War, 1917.—Although the election had been so close, President Wilson stood in a very strong position in the United States and in the world. He was reëlected. His policy, whatever it was, was approved. He felt that he had the nation politically united. The Administration soon began to take a firmer tone in protesting against the Allied system of neutral blockade. Meanwhile the Allies were hard pressed. During the summer of 1916 the Russians made their last aggressive campaign against Austria-Hungary. Rumania entered the contest Aug. 28 1916 but was defeated by the Germans by the close of the year. England, France and Italy were holding the western lines with difficulty. It seemed to President Wilson that only the one great neutral nation could bring about peace. Dec. 18 1916, six weeks after the election, he sent an appeal to the warring Powers to take some steps to come to an understanding of each other's demands. In a later document, Jan. 27 1917, he suggested a “peace without victory,” which should give the right of self-determination to the different national units. The western Allies responded courteously. The practical German answer was a brief note communicated by Ambassador Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing Jan. 31 1917, announcing that the Germans would shortly resume submarine warfare without mercy. High military authority in Germany had decreed that this was the way to win. They were convinced that the Americans would never sacrifice the large profits of export trade and incur the huge expenses of war merely for the sake of a question of neutral maritime rights.
Nevertheless it was announced Feb. 4 that the United States was using its influence to persuade other neutrals to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, and immediate steps were taken to make the navy ready for war. Unfortunately, the United States at that moment was not in a position to assemble even so small a land force as 30,000 men and send it abroad. It had no organized transport service to carry numbers of troops or their supplies. For a time the President dallied with a plan of maintaining official neutrality while arming merchant ships and authorizing them to defend themselves. This measure, proposed to Congress Feb. 26, certainly would have brought about war in a few days, by an engagement between some American merchant ships and a submarine. Although Congress was ready to grant to the President almost any power, this armed ship bill was killed by a filibuster in the Senate, which the President characterized as the act of “a little group of wilful men representing no opinion but their own.” The Administration then took steps to arm merchant ships without Congressional authority. One result of the controversy was the adoption by the Senate March 8 of a mild and cumbrous method of cutting short debate by closure.
During Feb. and March 1917 a few American vessels and one belligerent vessel having Americans on board were torpedoed by German submarines. It was apparent, therefore, that Germany would not desist from these atrocities, and that the United States must resort to war. The President called Congress in special session for April 2. Congress, elected the previous Nov., contained a small Democratic majority in both Houses and welcomed the first woman representative in the person of Miss Jeannette Rankin of Montana. On Feb. 8 the Government published an intercepted German despatch to the Mexican Government asking the Mexicans to join in the war, promising them the “former Mexican provinces,” long incorporated in the
