United States. This so-called “Zimmerman Note” further suggested that Mexico induce Japan to desert the Allies and join her in war on America. The participation of the United States in the war was now inevitable. A formal declaration signed by the President April 6 after a House vote of 373 to 50 and a Senate vote of 82 to 6, stated that war had been already begun by Germany. Relations with Austria and Turkey were at once broken off, but the declaration of war with Austria was delayed until Dec. 17 and no declaration was ever made against Turkey.
Though the breach with Germany was initiated by a Democratic President and passed by a Congress in which the Democrats had a small majority, it was a spontaneous national action representing the practically universal belief that the United States could no longer live in peace with such a nation as Germany had become. In a succession of brilliant speeches President Wilson had developed the idea that it was the duty of the American people to make the world “safe for democracy.” Moreover, there was widespread sympathy with the three western Powers closest to the United States in their political principles and system of government. Righteous wrath was aroused by the German treatment of the people of Belgium and other conquered countries. In some minds existed a genuine and well-grounded fear of a future attack upon the United States by Germany if the resistance of the Allies should be destroyed. Amid all the motives for the war, the one thing clear was that the American people recognized Germany as an enemy, and the enemies of Germany as natural friends and partners in the great enterprise of subduing “the Hun.” (See also World War.)
War Measures.—Passionate national spirit, patriotism, and urgent reasons for war were all useless unless the United States could enroll, train, equip, convey, and continuously supply an immense army. By improved methods of coping with submarines the British were giving such protection to their merchantmen as to keep up their connexions with the centres of food, raw materials and munitions. The American navy, though the vessels were good and the crews skilled and well commanded, was in no position to give direct aid in the process of destroying the German army and still less the German navy. The main service to be rendered by the United States must clearly be to raise and convey to the fighting front a large force of American troops. Under the Act of 1916 nothing had been done toward organizing an efficient expeditionary force—a real army was still to be made.
One saving service the United States was able to do at once: it could help the western Allies in their pressing financial difficulties. Besides the immense industrial production of military and other supplies, the country was blessed with an abundant surplus of foodstuffs. The main crops of 1915 and 1916 were large and prices high. The U.S. Treasury and banks were holding about $3,000,000,000 in gold, which was one-third of the world's supply. Federal taxes were low and little felt. The new income-tax was just beginning to be significant. The total Government income for the fiscal year 1916-7 was $1,118,182,978.
Soon after the declaration of war by the United States, missions from the various Allied countries were sent to America to suggest from their experience plans for coöperation. The British Mission, headed by Arthur Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, and including military and naval officers as well as financiers, reached Halifax April 20 and proceeded to Washington. The French Mission, headed by René Viviani, the former Premier, and including Marshal Joffre, landed at Hampton Roads April 24. Other missions came from Italy, Belgium, Russia, Rumania and Japan. Conferences were held with officials of the U.S. army and navy departments with regard to the prosecution of the war. Afterwards the French Mission travelled through the eastern and middle western states, visiting Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, Springfield (Ill.), Philadelphia, New York, and Boston; it was everywhere welcomed with enthusiasm, Marshal Joffre being hailed as a hero. With the Japanese Mission an important agreement was signed (the so-called Lansing-Ishii Agreement), which recognized Japan's special interests in China, but provided for a continuance of the “open door” policy for commerce in that country. The commissioners from the European Allies asked for immediate financial assistance. Under Acts of Congress beginning Oct. 17 1917, the Allies received credits which amounted eventually to $9,500,000,000: this was supplied to take up the floating debts held in the United States and to purchase more supplies. This material support, backed by the moral support given by America, was a great encouragement to the Allies through the winter campaign of 1917-8.
These enormous payments were among the results of the so-called Liberty loans. April 24 1917 was passed the first loan Act, under which some 4,000,000 people joined in offering in June $3,000,000,000 to the Government. Three later issues of Liberty bonds followed, and in 1919 an issue of Victory notes. The result was an increase of the interest-bearing debt from $972,469,290 on Dec. 31 1916 to $25,234,496,000 in 1919. These loans were supplemented by the War Revenue Act of Oct. 17 1917, which laid a variety of new taxes, increased the income-tax heavily, and combined with it an excess-profits tax, the purpose of which was to bring into the Treasury unreasonable profits likely to be made in the war industries.
All limitations on raising an army were discarded. Volunteers were authorized as in previous wars. Ex-President Roosevelt asked permission to raise a division of which he might take command, and Congress gave its authority for such a special force, but the President refused him a commission. It was soon seen, however, that the only fair and helpful method was to call out all able-bodied men within certain ages. May 18 the Selective Service Act was passed, which provided for raising the regular army and National Guard to authorized strength, and also the enlistment of 1,000,000 men by “selective draft.” There was abundant raw material, but it took time and energy to make it available. A system was provided for registering all men of military age. When they were compelled to appear for physical and mental examination the astounding facts were revealed that one-fourth were illiterate, one-fifth were physically unfit for military service, and another fifth defective but not enough so to prevent their serving. (See the table below.) When called up, the men had to be clothed, housed, fed and drilled. Thousands of officers were necessary, and training camps, both for men and officers, were established on a vast scale. Eventually about 4,000,000 men out of 11,000,000 registrants were inducted into the service.
Table Showing Rejections of Draftees for Physical Defects by Local
and Camp Boards, Compiled by Maj. Albert G. Love,
Office of the Surgeon-General.
| Local Boards |
Camp Boards |
Total | |||||
| 1. | Infectious diseases (excluding tuberculous and venereal) | 1,415 | 351 | 1,766 | |||
| 2. | Tuberculous | 69,935 | 15,446 | 85,381 | |||
| 3. | Venereal | 5,796 | 9,342 | 15,138 | |||
| 4. | General | 31,772 | 13,878 | 45,650 | |||
| 5. | Nervous system | 37,873 | 8,717 | 46,590 | |||
| 6. | Mental alienation | 40,167 | 12,930 | 53,097 | |||
| 7. | Eyes and their annexa | 91,755 | 25,531 | 117,286 | |||
| 8. | Ear | 30,794 | 8,699 | 39,493 | |||
| 9. | Nasal fossae | 1,892 | 1,257 | 3,149 | |||
| 10. | Throat | 1,216 | 3,416 | 4,632 | |||
| 11. | Circulatory system | 110,527 | 31,769 | 142,296 | |||
| 12. | Respiratory system | 8,365 | 4,448 | 12,813 | |||
| 13. | Digestive system | 42,900 | 42,928 | 85,828 | |||
| 14. | Genito-urinary system (non-venereal) | 7,186 | 1,843 | 9,029 | |||
| 15. | Skin and cellular tissue | 5,949 | 2,535 | 8,484 | |||
| 16. | Bones and organs of locomotion | 113,287 | 58,533 | 171,820 | |||
| 17. | Congenital malformations and ill-defined | 97,889 | 20,864 | 118,753 | |||
| Total defects | 698,718 | 262,487 | 961,205 | ||||
| Cases with two defects in one man (rejected men only) | 149,619 | 55,865 | 205,484 | ||||
| Total men rejected for above causes | 549,099 | 206,622 | 755,721 | ||||
| Total men examined, not defective in those respects | 3,215,002 | 2,538,451 | |||||
| Total men examined | 3,764,101 | 2,745,073 | |||||
| Total number of men in Class 1 available who were not inducted | 469,929 | ||||||
| Total number of defective men included in the 2,745,073 who were not rejected, but accepted for military service | 848,482 | ||||||
