The total vote polled by the Venizelist party throughout Greece was actually 436>?8i as against 525,642 cast for all the other parties. Venizelos himself received a huge majority in Athens and Piraeus, but was defeated by the vote of the rural population of Attica. It is evident therefore that the large majority of anti- Venizelist deputies returned to the Chamber (256 out of 369) did not in any way correspond to a real anti- Venizelist majority in the electorate at large. After the election, and Constantine's return to Athens as King, a noticeable revulsion of feeling set in,
, especially in provinces where the anti- Venizelist vote had been strong. But up to Sept. 1921, when the great Greek statesman was occupied in cementing his domestic happiness by a second marriage in England, and the Greek army in Asia Minor was engaged in costly military operations against Turkey by way of making up for the loss of his powerful diplomacy, Venizelos himself had taken no further steps towards a restoration of his active influence in the national politics. He had been left a widower in 1895, with two sons, Kyriakos (b. 1893) and Sophocles (b. 1895) ; and his second wife, to whom he became engaged in Paris in the summer of 1921, the wedding being celebrated on Sept. 15 in London, was Miss Helena Schilizzi, heiress of a Greek Chiot family established in England.
See C. Kerofilas, Eleutherios Venizelos (1915); S. B. Chester, Life of Venizelos (1921).
VERDUN, BATTLES OF (1916-7). On Dec. 6, 7 and 8 1915, the commanders-in-chief of the Allied armies on the western
'front, Sir Douglas Haig (Great Britain), Gen. Alexieff (Russia)
- and Gen. Cadorna (Italy) , met together at Chantilly for a con-
ference presided over by Gen. Joffre (France). The question to be considered was the best method of applying the suggestion 'of M. Briand, who had been president of the council of French ministers since Oct. 20 1915, for united action on an united front. It was decided to start a general offensive simultaneously on all fronts as soon as the British army had been able to obtain and train the expected reinforcements, and as soon as the Russian 'army, which had been severely tried by the 1915 campaign, had 'been reorganized as to men and war material, and the French ' army had its full complement of heavy artillery, trench mortars (and ammunition reserves. Until the fulfilment of these necessary conditions it was impossible to fix a date for the offensive; it was, however, to take place as soon as possible. In the event of the enemy foreseeing the Allied attack and attacking lone part of the front first the defender should be assisted by his Allies to their utmost powers.
On Feb. 18 Gen. Joffre chose the Somme as the theatre of the Franco-British offensive, and wrote to Sir Douglas Haig that 'the attack should take place about July i. But the German High Command had decided upon a winter offensive. Maj.-Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, who had relieved Gen. von Moltke as commander-in-chief of the armies in the field, was in reality generalissimo of the Central Powers; the Austrian High Command had suggested to him that nearly the whole of the Austrian forces should be directed against Italy, and that nine new German divisions should be sent as reinforcements to the Russian front. When once Italy was put out of action 400,000 Austrians would then be available to take part in the battle against France. Falkenhayn, however, rejected this proposal because he did not believe that a defeat upon a frontier of such extent would cause Italy to lay down her arms.
At the end of Dec., in a memorandum to the Kaiser, Falken- hayn reviewed the situation to the following effect. England, he said, was the soul of the Entente and the implacable enemy of Germany; she was exhibiting to-day the same tenacity that she showed in her historical struggles against the Low Countries, Spain, France and Napoleon. But in order to exhaust the re- sources of Germany she could hardly count on anything but a 'war of attrition; and Falkenhayn recognized that in reality time was on the side of the Entente. It was then necessary to strike a blow at England. But where? It was not possible to bring about !a decision in the East; any success would be purely of a local i nature, without influence on the course of the war. In France the marshy soil of Flanders was an obstacle up to the middle of
the spring; and as regards the British positions farther south, the objectives were too distant and their conquest would necessi- tate the employment of 30 divisions at least, which in point of fact the German army did not possess, and experienced officers were lacking to form the nucleus for new formations. Since England was out of reach, it was necessary to deprive her of her weapons, which were the Allied armies, and to give up the idea of a direct attack against the British armies. " Obviously this is a pity from the point of view of what our feelings are towards our chief enemy in this war," said Falkenhayn, " but it is necessary to accept the situation. Above all the enemy must be struck at through submarine warfare carried out to its limit. There was no sort of imprudence in risking the hostility of America. Be- cause of the strong current of political opinion which is favourable to Germany it is doubtful whether the United States could decide to take any active measures on the European continent. It is still more doubtful whether they would be able to intervene in time with sufficiently strong forces. In order to destroy the tools of England on the Continent, Austria-Hungary has de- manded that Italy should be attacked. This scheme, however, must be discarded: its realization would have as its only result the securing of future advantages for Austria-Hungary, but it would not have any immediate influence on the war taken as a whole. Even if Italy abandoned the Entente (and this is difficult to admit) her defection would not have an appreciable effect on England. The military aid of Italy is so little, and Italy in any case is so much under the thumb of England that it would be strange to make any mistake in this appreciation of the situation. Interior troubles which may be expected in Italy at no long date will paralyze the power to fight in that country.
" The same thing," continued Falkenhayn, " applies to Russia. Her internal distress will soon oblige her to change her tune. An offensive on a grand scale is impossible for her in winter. In addition strategic objectives are not to be found: the capture of St. Petersburg would much complicate the question of supply; an advance against Moscow would lead us into the desert; the Ukraine is a granary, but we must wait for the settlement of the Rumanian question before pursuing the occupation of it. All the Allies then have been successively eliminated: only France remains. France," Falkenhayn repeats, " has almost arrived at the end of her military effort, with a devotion that has been after all admirable. If her people can be made to understand clearly that there is nothing more to be hoped for from a military point of view, the worst will be over and England will find herself without her best sword. A break-through carried out in mass, an operation which is doubtful and beyond the power of our forces, is not necessary in order to reach this end. Even by the employment of limited effectives our aim can probably be reached. Behind the French line on the western front there are objectives which are within accessible range, and for which the French Command would have to fight to the last man."
Falkenhayn saw then the solution in a terrible conflict of attrition fought out on a limited front against the French army by the German army; the latter holding the initiative in attack could manipulate it according to circumstances and limit itself in effort and in losses. Two objectives presented themselves, Belfort and Verdun. The capture of either would have an enormous moral effect in France. Between these two Falkenhayn chose Verdun, for the following military reasons. " The French lines here are still at a distance of about 20 km. from the German lines of communication. Verdun is always the most powerful point d'appui for every attempt of the enemy to make untenable the German position in France and Belgium by the employment of relatively weak effectives."
This noteworthy report by Falkenhayn is full of the most detailed comments on the general situation of the Central Powers and on the conduct of the war as seen at that time by the German High Command. It displays naively his hate for England and contempt for the United States. It should be compared with William II.'s speech on June 15 1918 to the Great General Staff, on the occasion of the anniversary of his coronation, when after three victorious offensives he was persuaded of certain victory
