and was already on the way to the Capital: " The German people did not clearly see, when war broke out, what meaning it would have. I see it very clearly. It was a question of a struggle be- tween two conceptions of the world. Either the Prussian, Ger- man, or Teutonic conception of the world, where right, liberty, honour and morals should triumph, or the Anglo-Saxon concep- tion, which implies abandonment to the idolatry of money. The peoples of the earth work as slaves for their masters the Anglo- Saxons, who hold them under the yoke. These twp conceptions struggle one against the other. It is absolutely necessary that one of the two should be overthrown."
In addition it is worthy of note that, in conjunction with the detailed and fairly exact appreciation on the internal state of Russia and Italy, a total misapprehension existed concerning the material situation and especially concerning the moral of France; the whole plan of campaign was based on the fact that France was nearly at the limit of its effort towards the end of 1915, and that it would only be necessary to create a certain friction on the French front to bring about a rapid exhaustion of the army and of the nation. Subsequent events showed in a striking way the fallacy of this idea.
Besides the reasons given by Gen. von Falkenhayn there were others which pointed to Verdun as the objective of a German offensive. The German commercial element, whose influence in the councils of the Imperial Government and amongst the military High Command was considerable, had represented in a memorandum to the Emperor the necessity of annexing the Briey basin, the mineral wealth of which would be a happy adjunct to the Sarre coal: this peace aim could be kept quiet, for the war map was evidently to play the chief r61e in those future negotiations which the supposed exhaustion of the Entente seemed to foreshadow. Moreover, the Imperial Crown Prince commanded the Army Group which was detailed to attack Verdun, and the honours which were to come to him therefrom would assure the future of the dynasty.
As soon as it was decided to attack Verdun local actions followed one another along the whole western front in order to divert the attention of the Allies; in Champagne, at Tahure, from Jan. 8-12, an operation took place followed by important works which ac- company the preparation of an offensive on a grand scale; on Jan. 24 in Flanders at Nieuport and Hetsas; on Jan. 23 in Artois at Thelus and at Givenchy on the 28th; in Picardy on the 2pth at Frise; in Alsace at Seppois on Feb. 13.
The chief aim was not to reach the objective laid down for each attack; it was a question of studying under what conditions and to what degree the preparation, lasting several days, thought up till then to be necessary, could be cut down by increasing the number of batteries, and through the rapidity of the rate of fire, of the German artillery. In 1915 the attacks carried out in Artois and in Champagne by the armies of the Entente had necessitated a preparation lasting from six to eight days. They gave the enemy time to meet the attack. In 1916 the German army was trying to regain the advantage of surprise.
Local Situation. During 1915 the French front at Verdun had played only a severely defensive role, rigidly set down by the High Command. The capture of Liege, Namur, Antwerp, Maubeuge and several other siege forts in France, had forced the admission that permanent fortifications had had their day. Whilst generalizing too hastily about certain experiences, the details of which were still not well known, it was admitted that every limited objective on which modern artillery was able to concentrate its fire should be smashed up in a few hours. Isolated defence of strong points and entrenched camps was no longer considerable; every detached fort became a nest for shells and could be defended only by evacuating it and by fighting outside. From this crept in the idea of submerging permanent work? in a defensive zone, a " fortified region " making them a part of the whole scheme of defence.
Further, in a decree of Aug. 3 1915 siege forts had been sup- pressed with their autonomous organization within an enclosed perimeter, which implied the consequence of an isolated defence. This gave back to the armies powerful artillery immobilized in the
interior of the country (2,300 heavy guns with 1,600,000 rounds and i, 800 field guns with 1,450,000 rounds) and territorial troops which were needed for urgent work on the front. Under the conditions under which the war was being fought it was inevitable, and this decree seemingly marked the definite end of the per- manent fortifications which were to render such great services during the battle of Verdun.
Prolonged and well-directed bombardments by the most powerful artillery left the armour-plated turrets intact; the deep concreted shelters remained constantly in use, and the troops found these instant and safe shelter hot food, provisions in food and munitions which prevented them from reaching the last extremity of exhaustion. The forts of old design needed deepening considerably, but they served their purpose usefully. One thing is certain, and that is that the officers commanding sectors which were attacked did not pay sufficient attention to the defence of the forts and fortified works.
The transformation of the entrenched camp of Verdun into a " fortified region " modified considerably the conditions of defence. The closed ring became an open chain; in addition, the salient on the right bank of the Meuse was very exposed, and quite rightly it appeared necessary to organize a second position on the left bank of the Meuse which would enable the continuity of the front to be reestablished, should it be necessary to aban- don the whole of the right bank to the enemy. But the manual labour and the engineering stores were lacking for the rapid construction of these important works; in 1915 the preparation for the offensive in Artois and Champagne had absorbed the greater part of available material, and on the entire front the requirements remained great, for every sector commander cried out for manual labour and material for work which was always urgent. The requirements of Gen. Herr, who commanded the fortified region of Verdun, were met only very sparingly. To- wards the end of 1915 he gave warning of the preparations for attack opposite his front, but Gen. Gouraud made identical remarks about the front opposite the IV. Army, which he was commanding in Champagne, where the enemy was feigning the preparation of an offensive. The French High Command be- lieved, moreover, that in the event of Verdun becoming the objective of the German offensive, that offensive would be made on both flanks of the old entrenched camp: on one side between the Argonne and the Meuse, on the other opposite St. Mihiel; the salient formed by the French positions on the right bank might then become untenable. It was hardly likely that the German High Command would limit itself to a frontal attack directed against a sector which was crowded with powerful and permanent fortifications. It was in this sense that Hindenburg himself addressed a reproach to his predecessor, and Gen. Herr inclined to the same view. It was necessary then to concentrate his efforts on the whole of the fortified region; this meant dis- persal of effort, as the means at his disposal were very limited. This scarcity had not only been pointed out to the Army Com- mand, but to the French Government and to Parliament. Colonel Driant, deputy of Nancy, had spoken to the Army Commission, of which he was a member, about the dangerous situation in which the whole defence of the French front in Lorraine was left, without labour or material. Making these complaints their own, the Army Commission had them trans- mitted to the Minister for War, Gen. Gallieni, who asked Gen. Joffre for explanations on Dec. 16. The next day Gen. Joffre explained the arrangements that he had [taken on all the French front, and stated a little quickly perhaps that they were realized at Verdun; and he complained that the Govern- ment might compromise discipline in the army if they welcomed grievances and requests of his subordinates. General Gallieni replied, in the name of the council of ministers, that the Govern- ment retained all its confidence in the commander-in-chief, and that there was no question of a conflict of authority.
Meanwhile the construction of narrow-gauge railways, and the establishment of ammunition parks and new batteries, were being disclosed in Champagne at the same time as in Lorraine, and these indications became further noticeable in front of
