acteristic which belongs to all voluntary actions which ought to be done or which it is our duty to do, and which does not belong to any except those which we ought to do; and similarly to discover some characteristic which belongs to all voluntary actions which ought not to be done and which it is our duty not to do, and which does not belong to any except these. To all these questions our theory thinks that it can find a comparatively simple answer. And it is this answer which forms the first part of the theory. It is, as I say, a comparatively simple answer; but nevertheless it cannot be stated accurately except at some length. And I think it is worth while to try to state it accurately.
To begin with, then, this theory points out that all actions may, theoretically at least, be arranged in a scale, according to the proportion between the total quantities of pleasure or pain which they cause. And when it talks of the total quantities of pleasure or pain which an action causes, it is extremely important to realise that it means quite strictly what it says. We all of us know
