this theory asserts that nothing is intrinsically good, unless it is or contains an excess of pleasure over pain, it is very far from asserting that nothing is good, unless it fulfils this condition. By saying that a thing is intrinsically good, it means, as has been explained, that the existence of the thing in question would be a good, even if it existed quite alone, without any accompaniments or effects whatever; and it is quite plain that when we call things “good” we by no means always mean this: we by no means always mean that they would be good, even if they existed quite alone. Very often, for instance, when we say that a thing is “good,” we mean that it is good because of its effects; and we should not for a moment maintain that it would be good, even if it had no effects at all. We are, for instance, familiar with the idea that it is sometimes a good thing for people to suffer pain; and yet we should be very loth to maintain that in all such cases their suffering would be a good thing, even if nothing were gained by it—if it had no further effects. We do, in general, maintain that suffering is good,
