only where and because it has further good effects. And similarly with many other things. Many things, therefore, which are not “intrinsically” good, may nevertheless be “good” in some one or other of the senses in which we use that highly ambiguous word. And hence our theory can and would quite consistently maintain that, while nothing is intrinsically good except pleasure or wholes which contain pleasure, many other things really are “good”; and similarly that, while nothing is intrinsically bad except pain or wholes which contain it, yet many other things are really “bad.” It would, for instance, maintain that it is always a good thing to act rightly, and a bad thing to act wrongly; although it would say at the same time that, since actions, strictly speaking, do not contain either pleasure or pain, but are only accompanied by or causes of them, a right action is never intrinsically good, nor a wrong one intrinsically bad. And similarly it would maintain that it is perfectly true that some men are “good,” and others “bad,” and some better than others; although no man can strictly be
