tweet. It did not call on Senator Faruqi to apologise, or to give her wealth away, or, in terms, to stop being critical of the British Empire or Australia. Rather, it told Senator Faruqi to "piss off back to Pakistan." Senator Hanson's tweet was merely an angry ad hominem attack devoid of discernible content (or comment) in response to what Senator Faruqi had said.
305 In the circumstances, Senator Hanson's tweet was not reasonable or in good faith. With regard to reasonableness, there was no rational relationship between what was said and the proclaimed purpose or reasons for the tweet, nor was it in a manner calculated to advance that purpose or reason. With regard to good faith, there was no conscientious approach to advancing the exercise of Senator Hanson's freedom of speech in a way that was designed to minimise the offence or insult, humiliation or intimidation suffered by people affected by it. In contrast, Senator Hanson carelessly disregarded, or was wilfully blind to, its effect upon people who would be hurt by it. Indeed, by her defence to this proceeding she maintains that her tweet was not materially offensive.
306 For the same reasons, although it can be accepted that Senator Hanson was commenting on a matter of public interest (being Senator Faruqi's tweet and its contents) and that her tweet was an expression of her genuine belief (being consistent as it was with beliefs she has espoused for years), Senator Hanson's tweet was not a fair comment.
307 In the result, Senator Hanson has failed to establish her s 18D defence.
THE IMPLIED FREEDOM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Introduction
308 As mentioned, Senator Hanson contends that in the event that I find, as I have, that her act in publishing her tweet was unlawful under s 18C(1) and not exempted under s 18D(c)(ii), then I should find that s 18C as read with s 18D is constitutionally invalid as being in conflict with the implied freedom of political communication as recognised in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; 189 CLR 520 and other cases in the High Court. Senator Hanson's challenge raises the question of the constitutional validity of Pt IIA of the RDA as the other provisions within that part all have a bearing on ss 18C and 18D.
309 That question was decided in favour of constitutional validity by Hely J in Jones v Scully at [239]–[240]. Senator Hanson consequently accepts that for me to uphold her contention it is necessary, for reasons of comity, that I be persuaded that Hely J was plainly wrong: BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v The National Competition Council [2007] FCAFC 157; 162 FCR
