234 at [88]–[89] per Greenwood J, Sundberg J agreeing; TFM Epping Land Pty Ltd v Decon Australia Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 93 at [61] per Basten JA, Meagher JA and Emmett AJA agreeing. Senator Hanson argues that because the party challenging the constitutionality of the relevant provisions in Jones v Scully was not legally represented and consideration of the point was dealt with briefly, some lesser standard than "plainly wrong" applies, but no authority was cited in support of that proposition. No doubt the Court in that case would have been assisted by more fully developed argument, and the jurisprudence of the High Court has developed in the intervening 22 years. I will bear those matters in mind when coming to my own view on the question at hand, including coming to a view as to whether Jones v Scully is plainly wrong.
310 The Attorney-General's exposition of the applicable principles, subject to a minor addition by Senator Hanson which I will identify in due course (at [353]), is uncontroversial. I therefore draw heavily on that exposition in what follows, and gratefully acknowledge the careful and comprehensive submissions on behalf of the Attorney-General.
311 The implied freedom of political communication is a qualified limitation on legislative power to ensure that the people of the Commonwealth may "exercise a free and informed choice as electors": Lange at 560. It extends "only so far as is necessary to preserve and protect the system of representative and responsible government mandated by the Constitution": Comcare v Banerji [2019] HCA 23; 267 CLR 373 at [20].
312 Whether legislation infringes the implied freedom is to be answered by: first, determining whether it places an "effective burden" upon communication; and secondly, determining whether that burden is "justified": Lange at 567–568; McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34; 257 CLR 178 at [5] and [69]. The question of "justification" involves both an identification of the purpose of the law or the end it serves, and an assessment of whether the law is "proportionate" (or "reasonably appropriate and adapted") to achieve that purpose or end: Lange at 562; LibertyWorks Inc v Commonwealth [2021] HCA 18; 274 CLR 1 at [45]–[46]. A law will be proportionate if it is "suitable", "necessary" and "adequate in its balance": McCloy at [2].
313 That analysis means that the inquiry can be expressed in three questions (see Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery [2019] HCA 11; 267 CLR 171 at [5]):
1. Does the law effectively burden the implied freedom in its terms, operation or effect?
2. If "yes" to question 1, is the purpose of the law legitimate, in the sense that it is
