POLLOCK V. BTBAM-BOAT LAUEA 137 �but in all points doubtful or obscure with reference to the principle of public policy which dictated its enactment, so far as that principle may be discovered from the law itself, and the purposes aimed to be accomplished by it, and from other statutes in pari materia; and the mere fact that the words in which the powers granted are expressed would be appropriate in a statute granting a power to pardon, if such a statute were possible, is no reason for applying to them the strict limita- tions to which they would be liable in such a statute, unless such limitations are also called for by the principle of public policy intended to be subserved by the enactment, or are necessary for the purpose of giving it a fair and reasonable application to the subject-matter legislated upon. Applying this rule to the reading of this statute, I think it is clear that the power to remit or mitigate penalties extends as well and as fully to penalties given to the person suing for the same as to those given to the United States, or one-half to the govern- ment and one-half to the informer, all of which classes of penalties are given in title 52 of the Eevised Statutes. I think there is no reason to construe the statute as giving to the secretary alternative powers, as claimed by libellant 's counsel — -first, as to cases where no suit has been instituted, only a power to remit or mitigate the penalty to be exercised before suit brought; and, secondly, if a suit has been insti- tuted, a power only to discontinue the suit. The word "or" may, it is true, be used in such a sense as indicating that the power is to do one only of two things; but qutte as frequently the use of the word "or" denotes that the power granted is to do either; that is to say, both of the two things mentioned. Thus, here, the reading that is called for, as well by the text of the law as by the evident purpose to be subserved by the statute, is that as to all the penalties referred to, except those which are purely punitive, as imprisonment or removal from ofîBce, — that is to say, as to all pecuniary penalties given by the statute, — the secretary has power, on ascertaining the facts, to remit or mitigate the same, and, if a suit haa been commenced, to discontiaue it. The additional power given to "discontinue any prosecution to recover penalties" may, pôr- ����
