138 FEDERAL REPOI'.TEE. �haps, Le applicable, as argued.only to suits in which the United States is plaintiff ; but the addition of this power in such cases, which is rather the means, or one means, of carrying into effect a remission, than a power to remit or mitigate, does not impair or take away the larger and more general power to remit or mitigate, which is expressly extended to ail the pecu- niary penalties of the statute, without exception. It seems to me to be doing violence to the meaning of the statute to infer from its terms that while the secretary can mitigate or reduce the amount of the penalty before suit brought, yet after suit brought he can do nothing but discontinue the suit ; that he has not power to let it go on to judgment for the reduced pen- alty. Nor can any sound reason be suggested for presuming an intent of the legislature to discriminate between a case where suit haa been brought in which half the penalty will go to the informer in the event of a judgment, which is undoubtedly subject to remission, even after suit brought, and a case where the whole of the penalty will go to him. The vesting of an interest in the informer by the beginning of the suit is the same in either case, and the evil inteuded to be guarded against by giving these powers to the secretary is the same in either case; or, if possible, the mischief is greater where the entire penalty goes to the informer. The obvious and humane purpose to be attained by this grant of power was to enable some responsiblo ofûcer ol the govern- ment, upon examination into the facts of the particular case, to prevent these penaltiea, some of which are severe, and might be ruinous from being used oppressively in cases where the violation of law was teclmical, unintended, acci- dentai, or without such criminal or bad intent as to be deserving of severe punishment, and also to prevent them from being inequitably applied for the satisfaction of the cupidity of informera. The power given to ascertain the facts implies that the power is to be exercised with reference to the facts ascertained, and not arbitrarily by the secretary. The power is similar to that exercised by the same officer in ■case of penalties and forfeitures under the customs revenue laws, where the power to remit or mitigate is to be exercised ����
