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Contents.
cxv
Essay. | Page | |
ii. the superior power of the militia to resist and overcome it, | No. XLV. | 331 |
l. concluding remarks on this particular branch of the subject, | 332 | |
C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Fœderal powers will be formidable to reserved powers of individual States, | 333 | |
b. "the particular structure of the Fœderal government and the distribution of its powers among its constituent parts," | XLVI. | 333 |
a. "its supposed violation of the maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct," considered, | 333 | |
A. the truth of the maxim conceded, | 334 | |
B. the proposed Constitution does not violate it, | 334 | |
a. the meaning of the maxim discussed, | 334 | |
i. the views of Montesquieu examined, | 334 | |
i. the British Constitution, as his standard of government, referred to, | 334 | |
ii. his own expressed reasons referred to, | 335 | |
ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, relative thereto, examined, | 337 | |
i. New Hampshire, | 337 | |
ii. Massachusetts, | 338 | |
iii. New York, | 339 | |
iv. New Jersey, | 339 | |
v. Pennsylvania, | 339 | |
vi. Delaware, | 340 | |
vii. Maryland, | 340 | |
viii. Virginia, | 340 | |
ix. North Carolina. | 341 | |
x. South Carolina, | 341 | |
xi. Georgia, | 341 | |
xii. general remarks on the State constitutions, | 342 | |
b. the necessity that "these departments shall be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others," considered, | XLVII. | 342 |
i. "the powers belonging to one department ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the others," conceded, | 343 | |
ii. "neither of them ought to possess an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their powers," conceded, | 343 | |
iii. what practical security can be provided for each, against the invasion of the others, considered, | 343 |