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Contents.
cxxv
Essay. | Page | |
v. Crete referred to, | No. LXII. | 442 |
c. objection, that the Senate will "gradually acquire a dangerous preëminence in the government and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy," considered, | 442 | |
i. the impossibility of such a result averred and discussed, | 443 | |
ii. the organization of the Senate of Maryland referred to, | 443 | |
iii. the organization of the two Houses of the British Parliament, | 444 | |
iv. the examples of the ancient republics referred to, | 444 | |
i. Sparta and her Ephori, | 444 | |
ii. Rome and her Tribunes, | 444 | |
iii. Carthage and her Senate, | 445 | |
v. the controlling influence of the House of Representatives, | 445 | |
E. "the powers vested in the Senate," | LXIII. | 446 |
a. the treaty-making power, | 446 | |
i. the great importance of that power, | 446 | |
ii. the authority to exercise it vested in those who will be best qualified to exercise it, | 446 | |
iii. a popular assembly does not possess such qualifications, | 447 | |
i. an intimate acquaintance with public affairs necessary, | 447 | |
ii. secrecy and despatch are often required, | 449 | |
iv. objections to this part of the proposed Constitution considered, | 450 | |
i. that the treaty-making power has not been delegated to men invested with legislative authority, | 450 | |
ii. that treaties so entered into are to be of supreme authority, | 451 | |
iii. that treaties so entered into are not repealable at pleasure, like Acts of Assembly, | 451 | |
iv. that they may be made instruments of oppression, | 451 | |
v. that proper guards against corruption are wanting, | 452 | |
A. the responsibility of senators considered, | 452 | |
v. concluding remarks, | 453 | |
b. the appointing of public officers, | LXIV. | 453 |
c. its authority as a court for the trial of impeachments, | 453 | |
i. the difficulty in forming such a court, in an elective government, | 453 |