state of the Union; in recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge expedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of adjournment; in receiving Ambassadors and other public Ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the officers of the United States.
Except some cavils about the power of convening either House of the Legislature, and that of receiving Ambassadors, no objection has been made to this class of authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any. It required, indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure, to invent exceptions to the parts which have been excepted to. In regard to the power of convening either House of the Legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect to the Senate at least, we can readily discover a good reason for it. As this body has a concurrent power with the Executive in the Article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call it together with a view to this object, when it would be unnecessary and improper to convene the House of Representatives. As to the reception of Ambassadors, what I have said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer.
We have now completed a survey of the structure and powers of the Executive department, which, I have endeavored to show, combines, as far as republican principles will admit, all the requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is,—Does it also combine the requisites to safety, in a republican sense,—a due dependence on the People—a due responsibility? The answer to this question has been anticipated in the investigation of its other characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these circumstances; from the election of the President once in four years by persons immediately chosen by the People for that purpose; and from
