Opinion of the Court
Ute, for instance, we described the “defendants’ activities” as falling “within the very language of one or the other of those subparagraphs, a ‘course of business’ or a ‘device, scheme, or artifice’ that operated as a fraud.” 406 U. S., at 153. (The dissent, for its part, offers no account of how the superfluity problems that motivate its interpretation can be avoided where subsections (a) and (c) are concerned.)
Coupled with the Rule’s expansive language, which readily embraces the conduct before us, this considerable overlap suggests we should not hesitate to hold that Lorenzo’s conduct ran afoul of subsections (a) and (c), as well as the related statutory provisions. Our conviction is strengthened by the fact that we here confront behavior that, though plainly fraudulent, might otherwise fall outside the scope of the Rule. Lorenzo’s view that subsection (b), the making-false-statements provision, exclusively regulates conduct involving false or misleading statements would mean those who disseminate false statements with the intent to cheat investors might escape liability under the Rule altogether. But using false representations to induce the purchase of securities would seem a paradigmatic example of securities fraud. We do not know why Congress or the Commission would have wanted to disarm enforcement in this way. And we cannot easily reconcile Lorenzo’s approach with the basic purpose behind these laws: “to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” Capital Gains, 375 U. S., at 186. See also, e. g., SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (the securities laws were designed “to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits”).
III
Lorenzo and the dissent make a few other important
