Page:Francis V. Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission.pdf/13

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LORENZO v. SEC

Opinion of the Court

arguments. They contend that applying subsections (a) or (c) of Rule 10b–5 to conduct like his would render our decision in Janus (which we described at the outset, supra, at 1–2) “a dead letter,” post, at 9. But we do not see how that is so. In Janus, we considered the language in subsection (b), which prohibits the “mak[ing]” of “any untrue statement of a material fact.” See 564 U. S., at 141–143. We held that the “maker” of a “statement” is the “person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement.” Id., at 142. And we found that subsection (b) did not (under the circumstances) cover an investment adviser who helped draft misstatements issued by a different entity that controlled the statements’ content. Id., at 146–148. We said nothing about the Rule’s application to the dissemination of false or misleading information. And we can assume that Janus would remain relevant (and preclude liability) where an individual neither makes nor disseminates false information—provided, of course, that the individual is not involved in some other form of fraud.

Next, Lorenzo points to the statute’s “aiding and abetting” provision. 15 U. S. C. §78t(e). This provision, enforceable only by the Commission (and not by private parties), makes it unlawful to “knowingly or recklessly… provid[e] substantial assistance to another person” who violates the Rule. Ibid.; see Janus, 564 U. S., at 143 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164 (1994)). Lorenzo claims that imposing primary liability upon his conduct would erase or at least weaken what is otherwise a clear distinction between primary and secondary (i. e., aiding and abetting) liability. He emphasizes that, under today’s holding, a disseminator might be a primary offender with respect to subsection (a) of Rule 10b–5 (by employing a “scheme” to “defraud”) and also secondarily liable as an aider and abettor with respect to subsection (b) (by providing substantial assistance to one who “makes” a false