Opinion of the Court
statement). And he refers to two cases that, in his view, argue in favor of circumscribing primary liability. See Central Bank, 511 U. S., at 164; Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. 148 (2008).
We do not believe, however, that our decision creates a serious anomaly or otherwise weakens the distinction between primary and secondary liability. For one thing, it is hardly unusual for the same conduct to be a primary violation with respect to one offense and aiding and abetting with respect to another. John, for example, might sell Bill an unregistered firearm in order to help Bill rob a bank, under circumstances that make him primarily liable for the gun sale and secondarily liable for the bank robbery.
For another, the cases to which Lorenzo refers do not help his cause. Take Central Bank, where we held that Rule 10b–5’s private right of action does not permit suits against secondary violators. 511 U. S., at 177. The holding of Central Bank, we have said, suggests the need for a “clean line” between conduct that constitutes a primary violation of Rule 10b–5 and conduct that amounts to a secondary violation. Janus, 564 U. S., at 143, and n. 6. Thus, in Janus, we sought an interpretation of “make” that could neatly divide primary violators and actors too far removed from the ultimate decision to communicate a statement. Ibid. (citing Central Bank, 511 U. S. 164). The line we adopt today is just as administrable: Those who disseminate false statements with intent to defraud are primarily liable under Rules 10b–5(a) and (c), §10(b), and §17(a)(1), even if they are secondarily liable under Rule 10b–5(b). Lorenzo suggests that classifying dissemination as a primary violation would inappropriately subject peripheral players in fraud (including him, naturally) to substantial liability. We suspect the investors who received Lorenzo’s e-mails would not view the deception so
