to the patient. Judge Cooley treats a breach of this duty as one of the wrongs in confidential relations (Cooley on Torts, 2d ed., 619). It is submitted that the liability of the physician in De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, must rest on his "undertaking" to act in a professional manner. While it is true that the physician is not privileged from testifying, this does not show there is no legal duty of secrecy, for the law simply does not allow the "undertaking," if it extends so far, to interfere with the ascertaining of truth in a judicial inquiry. It is needless to comment on the oft-attacked rule that physicians and the clergy are not privileged. As long as it exists, however, it must be a good defence for the physician in any action for the disclosure of a communication. The exact limits of this "undertaking" can only be ascertained when the question actually comes up. Whether, as some physicians claim, disclosure can be made as necessity requires, the physician being the judge of the necessity, though the secret is the patient's, will then be determined. In determining this question, it would seem that aid should be sought in the testimony of physicians and others having special knowledge.
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — Any decision declaring a statute unconstitutional upon general grounds, with a vigorous dissenting opinion, is likely to awaken general interest. The case of Commonwealth ex rel. Roney v. Warwick, Mayor, 33 Atl. Rep. 373 (Pa.), therefore, which sets forth a. novel view of the constitutional restrictions on the powers of the legislature, has naturally aroused some discussion. A statute was passed in Pennsylvania directing that certain words in a previous statute, defining the term for which a certain appointee should hold office, should be construed to mean something which they evidently had not previously meant; many years later the question arises as to the length of such an appointee's term; and the court has refused to give the latter statute any effect, on the ground that it was unconstitutional, as an attempt to usurp judicial functions by directing the courts to construe an existing law in a manner contrary to its clear meaning.
This amounts to a decision that all "declaratory" or expository statutes are wholly void, except when there was a real ambiguity in the terms of the previous law. Now the only ground on which such statutes have hitherto been declared unconstitutional has been that they were retrospective in their application. In all the cases cited by the court the question was whether the legislature had power to direct the courts to apply the law as stated by the declaratory statute to transactions occur- ring before its enactment. And it has been often held that the legislature has no such power; or, if it might conceivably have such a power in some cases, is not to be presumed to intend to exercise it. Even the English courts are reluctant to allow a statute to interfere with rights already vested; and in this country the courts have the advantage of being usually able to find some constitutional impediment. Exceptions are allowed to this rule against giving statutes retrospective application only in certain classes of cases where no vested rights are considered to be involved, besides the cases where the previous statute was really ambiguous, in which cases the legislature's explanation of its true intent is entitled to respect.
There has never been any decision, however, until this Pennsylvania case, that a declaratory statute is not binding on the courts so far as it is
