NOTES. 125 applicable to transactions occurring after its enactment. Such statutes, which are common in many jurisdictions, practically amount to re-enact- ments of the previous law in amended terms, and are given effect accord- ingly. It is true that a statute may be objectionable in form which purports to be capable of retrospective application when such an appli- cation would be unconstitutional. It by no means follows, however, that it should be held altogether void. Judge Cooley, in a passage subsequent to that quoted by the majority of the court in support of their opinion, makes an important qualification of his objections to declaratory statutes : " But in any case," he says, " the substance of the legislative action should be regarded rather than the form ; and if it appears to be the intention to establish by the declaratory statute a rule of conduct for the future, the courts should accept and act upon it, without too nicely inquiring whether the mode by which the new rule is established is or is not the best, most decorous, and suitable that could have been adopted." Cooley on Con- stitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 113. The objections to declaratory statutes are recognized in the Pennsyl- vania Constitution of 1874, the provisions of which as to the form in which all statutes shall be passed prevent any statute similar in form to the one in dispute from being now enacted. But that, of course, does not concern an act of 1867. The courts may dislike the form of a statute the provisions of which appear to apply to past as well as future cases, when it would be an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial authority to direct the court to apply them retrospectively. But it would seem that the fairest manner of regarding the statute would be to take it as intended only to apply prospectively. By insisting on their objections to the form of the statute, the court would almost seem, in their zeal against statutes that might be retrospectively applied, to be in effect retrospectively applying the provisions of the Constitution of 1874. Liquor-Selling by Clubs. — Is a social club, which dispenses liquor to its members in the ordinary mode, amenable to the liquor law? The conflict of authority on this point is doubtless due partly to variations in the wording of the different statutes. But even where the statutes are substantially the same, courts have reached the most divergent results. The form in which the question ordinarily arises is this: Does the deal- ing out of liquor by the steward of a club in response to the order of a member constitute a sale within the meaning of a statute which provides that no one shall sell liquor at retail, to be drunk on the premises, with- out a license? The New York Court of Appeals has just answered this question in the negative. In People v. Adelphi Club, 43 N. E. Rep. 410, it was held that the dispensing of liquors by a social club, which has a limited and select membership, and was organized for a legitimate pur- pose, to which the furnishing of liquors to its members is merely inciden- tal, is not a sale within the meaning of the law. The weight of authority is in accord with this view. Commomvealth v. Pomphret, 137 Mass. 564 ; Seitn V. State, 55 Md. 566 ; State v. St. Louis Club, 28 S. W. Rep. 604 (Mo.). Strictly speaking, it would seem that the transaction amounts to a sale. It can hardly be called a mere division of property belonging to the members of the club in common. The title to the liquor is certainly in the club, and though it is transferred only to members and without expec-
