126 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. tation of profit, it is difficult to discover any element of a sale that is lack- ing. If the club is a corporation, this is true beyond the possibility of a doubt. Consequently, many courts have held clubs liable without going further. State v. Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633 ; State v. Essex Club^ 53 N. J. Law, 99 ; People v. Bradley, 11 N. Y. Supp. 594. The question, however, is not simply whether there is a sale, but whether there is a sale of the sort the legislature intended to foibid. Much can doubtless be said on both sides of this question. On the one hand, it is urged that as the sale of hquor by clubs is of so different a na- ture from the ordinary bar-room sale, a statute which is manifestly aimed directly at the latter should not be taken to include the former without express words. Black on Intoxicating Liquors, § 142. On the other hand, it may be contended, perhaps even more forcibly, that, as the lan- guage of the statute fits the case so closely, and liquor-selling by clubs is so notorious, the legislature would have expressly reserved it from the operation of the statute if the intention had not been to include it. In jurisdictions where the former view is adopted, the club, in order to be protected, must of course be a bo7ia fide organization with other objects than the mere dispensing of liquor. Courts which take the latter view have often failed to notice this distinction. For example, in State V. Neis^ 13 S. E. Rep. 225 (N. C), the court said, "If the gentlemen composing the Cosmopolitan Club of Asheville can be exempted from the liquor tax by the simple device of treating themselves as unorganized ten- ants in common of a stock of spirituous liquors, and employing an agent to furnish drinks to any members of their club and their friends, by sell- ing at cost, the same can be done by any five hundred or five thousand patrons of a bar-room." This conclusion by no means follows from the premises. If the club is a mere device to avoid the liquor law, it would nowhere be protected. See Rickart v. People, 79 111. 85. The Liability of a Public Treasurer. — There is considerable dif- ference of opinion in the cases as to the extent of the liability of a public treasurer. Does the bond ordinarily required of such an official make his liability greater than that imposed by the common law on all fidu- ciaries? Two recent cases are of interest, as the courts arrive at opposite conclusions on this question after reviewing the authorities. In State v. Copela?id, 34 S. W. Rep. 427 (Tenn.), on a bond with the usual conditions for faithful performance of duty and for paying over the public money as required, etc., it was held that the official was not liable for a loss not due to any negligence on his part. There is nothing in such a bond to increase the common law liability. In reaching this conclusion the court is strongly influenced by considerations of public policy, especially by the fear that the better class of men will not accept office when doing so in- volves the assumption of so great a liability. In Fairchild v. Hedges, 44 Pac. Rep. 125, the Supreme Court of Washington (one judge dissenting) held that a county treasurer is liable on the undertaking in his bond for money deposited in a bank that fails, though due care was exercised in its selection. While the court thinks this view is in accord with sound public policy, it rests the decision on the terms of the bond. The two main points on which a difference of opinion is to be found in the authorities are illustrated by these cases. Whatever opinion one may have on the public poHcy involved in this question, a discussion of it is
