TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION 145 cannot recover, as it did not have (absolute) title to the land by adverse possession or otherwise at the time the right of action accrued. "That its title became complete by prescription after the cause of action accrued places it in no different position from what it would have been if it had not been in possession but had acquired title by conveyance after the right of action accrued." ^ This case may be explained on the theory that the statute of limita- tions simply quiets that title which the adverse possessor already has by virtue of his possession, and the doctrine of relation does not cure any defects in the possessory title except the former owner's right to recover possession. The statutory extinguishment of the title of the dispossessed owner of land does not destroy easements or restrictive covenants, and it has been held that persons entitled to the benefit of restrictive covenants may enforce them against the new owner by adverse possession.^^ These burdens and privileges with reference to the land are not incident to the estate of the dispossessed owner, and adverse possession of the land does not destroy them, if there is no adverse user. The efficiency of the doctrine of adverse possession in quieting title is greatly impaired by reason of two exceptions to the opera- tion of the statute, viz., that of disabiHties and that of future estates. It has been proposed by the American Association of Title Men (1913), in order to render land titles simpler and more secure, to reduce the period of Hmitation on actions to recover land to ten years, and to abolish the saving clauses for persons under disabihty. If titles were quieted by possession regardless of disabilities, such as absence from the state, infancy, insanity, coverture, or imprison- ment, this would add greatly to the security of all titles, and we should then be able to rely on mere lapse of time, coupled with proof of continuity of possession and claim of title, to cure all de- fects and automatically to quiet titles. Friends or relatives or guardians will ordinarily protect the rights of owners under dis- ^ La Salle Coal Co. v. Sanitary District, 260 HI. 423, 430, 103 N. E. 175 (1913). See also 27 Harv. L. Rev. 496; 20 Harv. L. Rev. 563; 13 Mich. L. Rev. 562; Perry V. Clissold, [1907] A. C. 73. « In re Nisbet & Potts' Contract, [1905] i Ch. 391; [1906] i Ch. 3861, 2 B. R. C. 844, 860.
