146 HARVARD LAW REVIEW ability, and individual cases of hardship would be more than bal- anced by the greater security of all titles. By the general rule, the statute of limitations on ejectment does not begin to run against a remainderman, or the holder of any other future interest until the preceding estate terminates, and he be- comes entitled to immediate possession. This is based on the proposition that the right of action does not accrue until that time, as he has no right of action until he is entitled to possession. It follows that while a life estate is outstanding, no one can initiate a holding adverse to the remainderman.^ The consequence is that, although one may hold possession of land for twenty years, claiming to own it absolutely against all the world, and may have color of title and pay taxes thereon, yet this possession will not be adverse to the holder of any future interest, although the claim may be brought home to the remainderman.'*^ By a somewhat daring piece of judicial legislation it has been held in Iowa and Nebraska that, where the statutes give a person out of possession an equitable remedy to quiet title, a remainderman may be barred by adverse possession where he has notice of the adverse holding.^® It is urged that the purpose of the statute is to provide a way to settle disputed questions of title between those in posses- sion of land and those who claim a future interest. Where an ad- verse claim of ownership is brought home to the holder of such future interest, his welfare, as well as that of the public in general, is best subserved by requiring that questions of title be settled within the statutory period. Accordingly, ejectment and all other remedies will be barred if the remainderman allows ten years to elapse after his right of action to quiet title accrues and thereafter the adverse possessor can quiet title in himself .^^ It may be argued that the barring of one remedy, viz., an action to quiet title, should not affect other remedies which have not yet
- Mixter v. Woodcock, 154 Mass. 535, 28 N. E. 907 (1891); Bohrer v. Davis, 94
Neb. 367, 143 N.W. 209, 148 N. W. 320 (1913); Wakefieldz). Yates, [1916] i Ch. 452. « Com. V. Clark, 119 Ky. 85, 83 S. W. 100 (1904); Gindrat v. W. Ry. Co. (Ala.) 19 L. R. A. 839 (1893), note; Barrett v. Stradl, 73 Wis. 385, 395; 41 N. W. 439 (1889); Dawson v. Edwards, 189 111. 60, 59 N. E. 590 (1901); Cassem v. Prindle, 258 HI. 11, loi N. E. 241 (1913); but cf. Nelson v. Davidson, 160 111. 254, 43 N. E. 361 (1896).
- Criswell v. Criswell, loi Neb. 349, 163 N. W. 302 (191 7). See also Marray v.
Quigley, 119 Iowa, 6, 92 N. W. 869 (1902); Crawford v. Meis, 123 Iowa, 610, 99 N. W. 186 (1904). " Holmes v. Mason, 80 Neb. 448, 114 N. W. 606 (1908).
