47^ HARVARD LAW REVIEW, that consequently the city is not hable for the neglect of firemen to per- form their duties adequately. Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Wheeler V. Cincin7iati^ 19 Ohio St. 19. And in the similar case of public water- works, which certainly are not maintained as a matter of private corporate interest, but for the general welfare and protection, it has also beui held with great unanimity, in accord with the decision under discussion, that neglect to carry on the work adequately will not support a private action. Tainterv. Worcester ^ 123 Mass. 311 ; Mendel v. Wheelings 28 W. Va. 233; Black V. Columbia^ 19 S. C. 412. It is often said that where a city derives a profit from exercising a par- ticular function, it is playing the part of a private corporation and is liable as such. And accordingly it was contended, in Instirance Co. v. Village of Keeseville, that the fact of the town's receiving rents from the takers of the water showed that it was a private enterprise. In answer- ing this argument the court points out that "the imposition of water rents is but a mode of taxation, and a part of the general scheme for the purpose of raising revenue with which to carry on the work of government." It should be borne in mind that the question discussed above is as to the liability of a city for failing to perform, or for performing inade- quately, a public duty. A different question arises in considering the liability of the city, not for mere nonfeasance, but for misfeasance in the performance of a duty, causing direct damage to the person or the property of a citizen. Hill v. Boston., 122 Mass. 344, 358; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 966. Many of the cases which seem at vari- ance with Insurance Co. v. Village of Keeseville, and the principles above set forth, are distinguishable on this ground. See, for example, Scott v. Manchester, 2 H. & N. 204 ; Bailey v. Mayor, &»c. of New York, 3 Hill, 531 ; Murphy v. Lowell^ 124 Mass. 564. Conveyance of an Expectant Estate. — The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently declared that the conveyance by a son of his expectant interest in his father's estate is invalid, even in equity. This decision meets with some support, but is contrary to the weight of authority. The court, while following two previously adjudicated Kentucky cases, also supports its decision by an argument of some length. It points to the generally accepted rule that the conveyance or assignment of a bare possibility is at law invalid, and argues that equity should not contradict the law, especially since the equity courts cannot agree upon a common theory for the enforcement of such a conveyance. It further asserts that to hold the conveyance invalid will be to "save multiplying contentions, protect the improvident children and heirs at law from fraud and deceit, — save free and untrammelled the actions of the possessors of estates in their distribution." McCaWs Adm'rw. Hampton, 32 S. W. Rep. 406 (Ky.). It is by no means a safe premise that equity should always follow the law ; and the argument that, because courts of law will not recognize a conveyance, courts of equity must also decline to recognize it, is unsound. The fact is that most American courts of equity will support such a con- veyance, while hardly a court of law will do so. But there is unques- tionably much confusion as to the theory on which it is to be supported. Some jurisdictions a[)ply the rules for the conveyance of real property. This leads them into the doctrine of estoppel, with all the confusion that
