NOTES. A77 attends it in this country. Practically all jurisdictions require covenants of warranty, or an equivalent, in order to raise the estoppel, but quarrel on the effect of the -estoppel. A Massachusetts decision, Trull v. East- vian, 3 Met. 121, holds that the estoppel passes the actual title at law. Other courts hold to the apparently sounder view that the covenant of warranty operates as a personal rebutter preventing the grantor from set- ting up his estate, or "as if a particular averment had been introduced, and the grantor was estopped by his deed from denying its efficacy." See Rawle on Covenants for Title, 3d edition, p. 412, notes 2 and 3. Accord- ing to this view the grantee's remedy would be purely in equity. Again, the assignment is supported, regardless of the covenant of warranty and its attendant estoppel, not as a conveyance, but as an executory agree- ment to convey, a present contract to take effect when the estate comes in esse, or as creating an equitable ownership to be changed to an abso- lute property when the son actually inherits. Bayler v. Cofnmonwealth, 40 Pa. St. 37. In these courts the conveyance of an expectant estate, and a contract for the assignment m futuro of personalty not in esse at the time of the contract, are regarded in the same light. Such a theory has at least the merit of doing full justice to all parties without violating any principles of law or equity. In nearly all jurisdictions such conveyances are closely scrutinized, owing to the ready opportunities for fraud. That is one reason why a covenant of warranty is held necessary in so many jurisdictions. Every- where the grantee must have sufficient consideration. The conveyance is looked upon with favor when it is known and approved by the party from whom the estate is to be derived. To invalidate the conveyance in such a case would be to defeat the intent and interest of all parties. In this case which the Kentucky court had to decide everything is favorable. There is a covenant of warranty, with good consideration, absence of fraud, and assent of the father. Under these circumstances, most courts of equity would hold a son's conveyance of his expectant estate to be valid. See 7 Harvard Law Review, 429. Incorporation by Reference — Statute of Frauds. — The note or memorandum required by the Statute of Frauds must contain certain terms. If some of those terms are on one paper and others on another, when may the two papers be read together? This question has been answered by the English courts in various ways; at first they were some- what strict, but for the last twenty years they have adopted a much looser rule. A recent case, however, Potter v. Peters (72 L. T. Rep. 624), looks rather hke a return to the older view. The whole subject is much confused by talking about parol evidence. The question is said to depend on whether parol evidence is admissible to show what the writing referred to, or under what conditions it was writ- ten. The difficulty, however, does not lie with any rule of evidence : there is no rule of evidence which forbids one to introduce both writings or to show all the accompanying circumstances. The real question is, What do these facts, when admitted, prove? Do they furnish a note or memorandum containing the requisite terms? One writing contains the defendant's signature and some of the terms, the other writing (assuming it to be unsigned) contains the lacking terms. Are the circumstances such that the second may be considered as part of the first, so as to con-
