behind the squadron, having been obliged to slacken speed owing to a machinery defect.
This accidental delay was perhaps incidentally the cause of subsequent events.
6. Towards eight o'clock in the evening this transport met the Swedish vessel Aldebaran and other unknown ships, which she fired upon, doubtless owing to the apprehensions aroused in the momentary circumstances by her isolation, the damage to her machinery, and her slight fighting value. However this may be, at 8.45 p.m. the captain of the Kamchatka despatched to his commander-in-chief by wireless the statement respecting this meeting that he was ' attacked on all sides by torpedo-boats.'
7. In order to understand the influence which this news might have had upon the subsequent decisions of Admiral Rogestvensky it must be remembered that in his anticipations the attacking torpedo-boats whose presence had thus been announced to him, rightly or wrongly, as being some fifty miles astern of the section of ships under his command, might overtake him towards one o'clock in the morning in order to attack him in turn.
This information decided Admiral Rogestvensky to signal to his ships towards ten o'clock at night to redouble their vigilance and to expect an attack from torpedo-boats.
8. On board the Suvaroff the Admiral had deemed it indispensable that one of the two senior officers of
