his staff should be on duty on the bridge during the night, in order to superintend in his stead the progress of the squadron, and let him know immediately should any incident occur.
Moreover, on board all the ships the permanent orders of the Admiral prescribed that the chief officer on duty was authorised to open fire in case of a manifest and imminent attack of torpedo-boats.
If the attack were made from ahead he was to do so on his own initiative, and in the contrary case, much less pressing, to refer to his commanding officer.
With regard to these orders, the majority of the Commissioners considered that they involved nothing excessive in time of war and particularly in the circumstances which Admiral Rogestvensky had every reason to consider very alarming in view of the impossibility he found of verifying the accuracy of the warnings that he had received from the agents of his Government.
9. Towards one o'clock in the morning, on October 9/22, 1904, the night was semi-obscure, somewhat overshadowed by a slight and low mist. The moon only showed itself at intervals through the clouds. The wind blew moderately from the south-east, raising a long swell, which made the vessel roll five degrees.
The course followed by the squadron towards the south-west necessarily led the last two sections, as was eventually proved, to pass in the neighbourhood of the habitual fishing-ground of the flotilla of the Hull
