the possession of Ferguson without security. These demands, if just claims against his estate at all, as we must suppose they were, existed at the time of his death, and were as capable of being asserted in a sworn bill brought within two years after the grant of letters testamentary to his executrix, as they were five years after by the bill then filed in this case.
In Walker as ad. vs. Byers, 14 Ark. 252, the court, by Mr. Justice Scott, said: "In this system, [meaning our administration system, upon which he was commenting,] two capital objects seem plainly in view from the various provisions for their attainment; first, that the estate of every deceased person, after death, shall immediately pass to the custody of the law, to be administered for the benefit of creditors, and after the satisfaction of all claims against it, that shall be presented within two years after the grant of letters testamentary, or administration, the residue shall in the next place be passed to the heir or distributee, quit of all claims against it which the law will allow of, as against an executor or administrator."
And after remarking upon the jurisdiction of the probate court, and its mode of dealing with estates, the judge continues thus: "In such a system, with a tribunal thus constituted, as its effective instrument we think it clear that the claims and demands which the statute contemplates shall be exhibited to the executor or administrator in the manner provided by the statute, before the end of two years from the granting of letters, on pain of being forever barred, are all claims capable of being asserted in any court of justice, either of law or equity, existing at the time of the death of the deceased, or coming into existence at any time after the death, and before the expiration of two years—including, of course, all claims, or demands running to certain maturity although not yet payable, to be adjusted presently, upon equitable principles of discount, according to the rate of interest when matured, or to be provided for at the day of maturity without discount, and excluding such claims only as might be inchoate and contingent, like that in the case of Burton vs. Lockhart, (4 Eng. R. 412,) and like dor-
