Page:Hill v. State.pdf/5

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608
CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT
[23 Ark.

Hill ex. vs. the State.
[December

mant warranties, broken by eviction after, the expiration of the two years."

"In excluding such possible claims, (continues the Judge,) indicated in the latter class, the statute does not destroy them, only as against any administrator or executor, and in preferring to them all claims that exist at the death, or come into existence at any time before the expiration of the two years, and therefore leaves them to be asserted against the heir or distributee, as such, as a superior equity to his, in the assets that may have descended, or been distributed to him after the estate of a deceased person has been administered for all the purposes contemplated by law. Whereas, every species of claim or demand, either legal or equitable, which comes within scope of the administration, as we have defined, will be forever barred, as against the heir or distributee, as the executor or administrator, if not exhibited in the matter provided by the statute, by the end of two years."

"From this exposition of our administration system, etc., etc., etc., it results that where one dies and leaves an estate, every claim or demand against it, for which it is liable, when in the course of administrator, in whatever manner asserted, must be authenticated, by the affidavit of the claimant, as provided by the statute, because in no other way can a claim be exhibited in accordance with the statute to prevent it being forever barred."

After noticing some exceptions to the rule as thus stated, which are unlike the case now before us, and showing that the statute of non-claim and not the general statute of limitations is applicable to demands against the estates of deceased persons, the Judge says: "In the light of these views, then, it is clear that the decree in this case cannot be sustained upon the cross-bill of Byers, because there is no pretence either that the cross-bill was sworn to or that it was filed, until long after the expiration of two years from the grant of letters of administration to Walker."

The principles announced in this opinion have been repeat-