BATTLE OF KYNOSSEMA. 103 but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros, not without, the loss, however, of four tri remes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilaus at Ekeus : the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by Ibo squadron from Abydos, and their united force, eighty-six tr/rcicys strong, was employed for one day in trying to storm Elsfis. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Ere- sus, much disappointed that his scouts had bee,n eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He Availed at Ekeus the return of the fugi- tive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, seventy-six in number, for a general action. After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestos up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron, under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynosse- ma, or the Dog's Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba: it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes, ten iTiore than Thrasyllus in total number, extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore ; the Syracusans under Her- mokrates being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Min- d{rus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibataj or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athe- nians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nau- Athenians opposite. As it was night, probably the best tiling which they could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could learn panic ulars of his position, and how or where they could render aid. We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the e-?ape of the Athenian squadron wit lout interruption from Sestos