.10 HISTORY OF GREECE. tical manoeuvring: nevertheless, the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manoeuvring had fallen off since the glo- ries of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; uor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them ; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the project- ing headland of Kynossema. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Pelo- ponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently vic- torious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Hav- ing driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponne- sian fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Helles- pont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Never- theless, eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian, and as many Boeotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellene, and Leukas, one each, fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals ; who, however, on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossema, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba ; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce. 1 1 Thucyd. viii, 105, 106 ; Diodor. xiii, 39, 40. The general account which Diodorus gires of this battle, is, even in its mogt essential features, not reconcilable with ThucydidSs. It is vain to try to blend them. I have bsen able to borrow from Diodorus hardly uiything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots and
