NEW SCHEMES OF ALKIBIADES. 3 retire to Tissaphernes. Probably lie was forewarned by Asty- ochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Milesians, nor foreseeing the full mischief which his desertion would bring upon Sparta. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiades soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic: a game of duplicity to which Tissaphernes himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the interven- tion of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King, Alkibiadtjs urged, to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other : he ought neither to bring up the Phenician fleet to the aid of the Lacedcemonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each part} r an instrument of exhaus- tion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both : first to break down the Athenian em- pire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves ; which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle. 1 Thus far Alkibiades gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedaemonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should pi-esent himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphernes from Lacedamion to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lace- daemonian or Athenian, it would nevertheless be found easier to ' Tlmcjd. viii, 45, 46.
