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far-reaching character of its terms, yet if the amendment does in fact bear a broader meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never thought of when it was conceived and put in form, and does reach social evils which were never before prohibited by constitutional enactment, it is to be presumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were doing and meant to decree what in fact they have decreed. The 'privileges and immunities" secured by the original Constitution were only such as each State gave to its own citizens, . . . . but the XIV. Amendment prohibits any State from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely requires equality of privileges, but it demands that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged and unimpaired.

In the same opinion, after enumerating some "privileges" of the citizens, such as were pertinent to the case on trial, but declining to enumerate all, the Court further says: .

These privileges can not be invaded without sapping the foundation of Republican government. A Republican government is not merely a government of the people, but it is a free government. . . . . It was very ably contended on the part of the defendants that the XIV. Amendment was intended only to secure to all citizens equal capacities before the law. That was at first our view of it. But it does not so read. The language is, "No State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.'? What are the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States? Are they capacities merely? Are they not also rights?

The Court in this seems to intimate very strongly that the amendment was intended to secure the natural rights of citizens, as well as their equal capacities before the law.

In a case in the Supreme Court of Georgia, in 1869, the question was before the court whether a negro was competent to hold office in the State of Georgia. The case was ably argued on both sides, Mr. Akerman, the present Attorney General of the United States, being of counsel for the petitioner. Although the point was made and argued fully, that the right to vote and hold office were both included in the privileges and immunities of citizens, and were thus guaranteed by the XIV. Amendment, yet that point was not directly passed upon by the court, the court holding that under the laws and constitution of Georgia, the negro citizen had the right claimed. In delivering the opinion, Chief Justice Brown said:

It is necessary to the decision of this case to inquire what are the "privileges and immunities "of a citizen, which are guaranteed by the XIV. Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Whatever they may be, they are protected against all abridgment by legislation .... Whether the "privileges and immunities "of the citizens embrace political rights, including the right to hold office, I need not now inquire. If they do, that right is guaranteed alike by the Constitution of the United States and of Georgia, and is beyond the control of the legislature,

In the opinion of Justice McKay, among other propositions, he lays down the following:

2d. The rights of the people of this State, white and black, are not granted to them by the constitution thereof; the object and affect of that instrument is not to give, but to restrain; deny, regulate and guarantee rights, and all persons recognized by that constitution as citizens of the State have egual, legal and political rights except as otherwise expressly declared,

3d. It is the settled and uniform sense of the word "citizen," when used in reference to the citizens of the separate States of the United States, and to their rights as such citizens, that it describes a person entitled to every right, legal and political, enjoyed by any